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[1] Business and war have one thing in common: strategy. “Never to be
undertaken thoughtlessly or recklessly, [strategy is] to be preceded by
measures designed to make it easy to” obtain the desired outcome.1 “A
skilled general must be master of the complementary arts of simulation and
dissimulation; while creating shapes to confuse and delude the [negotiating
adversary] he conceals his true dispositions and ultimate intent.”2 His actions
“are designed to entice the [adversary], to unbalance him, and to create a
situation favourable for a decisive counter-stroke.”3
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1
SUN TZU, THE ART OF WAR 39 (Samuel B. Griffith ed., 1963); see also CLAUSEWITZ
ON STRATEGY: INSPIRATION AND INSIGHT FROM A MASTER STRATEGIST 4-5 (Tiha von
Ghyczy et al. eds., 2001) (“Business and war may have many elements in common, but as
total phenomena they will remain separated forever by the distinct and irreconcilable nature
of the forces that give rise to them and the outcomes they engender.”).
2
TZU, supra note 1, at 41.
3
Id.
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[2] As trademark practitioners, we must function as skilled generals, leading
our clients not to victory, but to the precipice of informed decision-making.
We must prepare our clients for battle  regardless of which battle they
choose to enter  in order to resolve their disputes or gain a competitive
advantage. Our preparation for business dispute resolution should remain the
same, regardless of whether our clients desire to negotiate, mediate, or
litigate their disputes to an acceptable conclusion.
[3] First, evidence must be gathered and analyzed.4 Second, the immediacy
of the injury to our clients must be fully examined. Third, the business costs
and probable outcomes of the seeking and granting of remedies must be
thoroughly examined.5 Fourth, after fully apprising our clients of all facts
related to the injury, we must counsel them to select the appropriate
mechanism in order to resolve the matter.6 Fifth, the parties must then
communicate back and forth, looking for agreement.7
[4] This article centers on the third stage. It provides a practical look at the
litigation and non-litigation mechanisms for remedying trademark disputes.
[5] Though many brand owners desire to use the judicial process to resolve
their trademark disputes, “the judicial process involves a high degree of risk
and uncertainty in outcome, unpredictable delays, invasive discovery
proceedings, and a substantial cost of time and money.”8 Typically, when a
4

See ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT
WITHOUT GIVING IN, 12 (Bruce Patton ed., 1981). As part of this process, practitioners “will
want to consider the people problems of partisan perceptions, hostile emotions, and unclear
communication, as well as identify [their] interests and those of the other side.” Id. at 12-14.
5
During this stage, practitioners must determine how they will handle people problems,
identify the most important interests for their clients, as well as realistic objectives, and
generate several options for resolving the dispute. Id. at 14.
6
Id.
7
Id. Practitioners that analyze the dispute solely from a litigation perspective conduct a
five-step analysis. Richard Birke & Craig R. Fox, Psychological Principles in Negotiating
Civil Settlements, 4 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1 (1999). First, they ask: “[h]ow much is a case
like this worth?” Second, they analyze their likelihood of success on the merits. Third, they
examine the discovery process: “[h]ow much information do I need to gather,” and “[h]ow
do I evaluate the strength of the information that I gather?” Fourth, they evaluate the
settlements: “[w]hat constitutes a good outcome,” and “[w]hat is a fair resolution of this
matter?” Finally, they analyze the negotiation process: “[s]hould I make the first offer or
wait until the other side makes it;” “[i]f I make it, how extreme should it be;” “[h]ow should
I frame or present my offer;” “[h]ow should I evaluate offers from the other side;” and
“[h]ow can I get people to accept my offers (or counter-offers)?” Id.
8
Myer Sankary, Legal Negotiations in Mediation Proceedings 1 (Nov. 20, 2002)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with Richmond Journal of Law & Technology).
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party files a complaint and seeks injunctive relief, it is the result of a failed
business negotiation. It may also stem from the desire of the well-heeled
party to seek an advantage in crafting a business agreement. In filing a
complaint, a brand owner may also subject themselves to antitrust claims,
based upon misuse of their intellectual property assets.9
[6] Perhaps the single most important factor in the outcome of trademark
litigation10 is whether preliminary injunctive relief is granted.11 When a
defendant begins using the plaintiff’s mark in commerce, the impact on the
plaintiff’s business is often immediate and potentially devastating.12 Each
sale of the defendant’s product or service takes money directly out of the
plaintiff’s pocket, depriving the plaintiff of goodwill benefits earned through
the selection and marketing of its brand. Consumers are potentially damaged
as well. They innocently purchase products or services under the mistaken
belief that such products or services are affiliated with the plaintiff.
Furthermore, in many cases, the defendant’s products or services are inferior,
and their continuing presence in the marketplace could cause more harm than
the judicial system could compensate with monetary damages.
9

Oftentimes, an alleged infringer of intellectual property rights defends itself against an
action by pointing to the culpable conduct of the rights’ holder. See 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(7)
(2000) (codification of trademark misuse); 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (2000) (codification of patent
misuse). See generally Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942) (patent
misuse); Worden v. Cal. Fig Syrup Co., 187 U.S. 516 (1903) (trademark misuse); MetroGoldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 269 F. Supp. 2d 1213 (C.D. Cal. 2003),
aff’d, 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004) (copyright misuse). An aggressive litigation foe,
however, may file a cross complaint for antitrust based upon misuse of the intellectual
property assets. See generally Grokster, 269 F. Supp. 2d 1213 (antitrust based on copyright
misuse); Marchon Eyewear, Inc. v. Tura L.P., No. 98-CV-1932, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
19628 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2002) (antitrust based on patent misuse); Juno Online Servs., L.P.
v. Juno Lighting, Inc. , 979 F. Supp. 684 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (antitrust based on trademark
misuse).
10
Although the issues discussed in this article generally apply equally to trademarks,
service marks, and trade dress, in consideration of simplicity, only the terms “trademark” or
“mark” are used.
11
See WILLIAM W. SCHWARZER ET AL., CALIFORNIA PRACTICE GUIDE: FEDERAL CIVIL
PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL § 13:151 (2004) (“The hearing on the application for preliminary
injunction is often the single most important hearing in the case.”); J. THOMAS MCCARTHY,
5 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 30:30 (4th ed. 2004) (“[I]f
plaintiff obtains a preliminary injunction, it immediately has the upper hand in the strategy
of the whole litigation.”).
12
In one court’s opinion, “‘damages occasioned by trademark infringement are by their
very nature irreparable.’” Int’l Kennel Club, Inc. v. Mighty Star, Inc., 846 F.2d 1079, 1092,
(7th Cir. 1988) (quoting Processed Plastic Co. v. Warner Communications, Inc., 675 F.2d
852, 858 (7th Cir. 1982)).
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[7] A temporary restraining order (“TRO”) or preliminary injunction
provides immediate relief to the plaintiff, preventing further use of the
trademark by the infringing party. The relief allowed may also include the
seizure of the infringing items. Courts, however, treat such requests by
plaintiffs with extreme caution so that the defendant is not prevented from
conducting its business, or some part of it, without a full hearing on the
merits of the infringement claim.
[8] From a strategic standpoint, the main advantage of seeking preliminary
injunctive relief is that the plaintiff can immediately prevent the defendant
from using the mark, without having to wait for a trial on the merits. This
can significantly disrupt the business of the defendant. Another advantage is
that obtaining a preliminary injunction is likely to induce settlement. This is
because the defendant must make a quick decision as to whether to appeal
the grant of injunctive relief. The defendant must also assess the likelihood
of overcoming the preliminary finding that the plaintiff is likely to prevail at
a trial on the merits.
[9] The disadvantages of seeking injunctive relief stem from the risk of
failure and the expense associated with making a request for an interim
injunction. An unsuccessful attempt to obtain a preliminary injunction may
weaken the plaintiff’s ability to prevail at a bench or jury trial,13 or obtain a
favorable settlement.14 This is because the denial of the request may be the
result of a judicial determination that the plaintiff’s case is weak. If interim
injunctive relief is granted, but the plaintiff loses at trial, the plaintiff may
have to forfeit the injunction bond. Worse yet, if the interim injunction was
improperly obtained, the plaintiff may be open to a damages suit by the
defendant.

13

Upon the filing of a complaint, the plaintiff can request either a bench or jury trial.
See Fed.R. Civ.P. 38 and 39. Further, there exists a right for any party to the action to
demand a jury trial. This right will granted depending upon whether equitable relief is
requested. See Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417 (1987); see also Ringling
BrosBarnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Division of Travel Dev., 955 F.
Supp. 598 (E.D. Va 1997) (jury trial was not granted to the plaintiff in trademark dilution
case because under 15 U.S.C.S. Section 1125(c)(1)-(2) plaintiff was limited to injunctive
relief). Historically, litigants have favored having their cases heard before the judge
rather than the jury. See J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 5 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND
UNFAIR COMPETITION, (4th ed. 2004) at § 32:130. However, jury trials have become
much more common in trademark infringement cases. Id.
14
In addition, a successful defendant may choose to file a Rule 68 offer of judgment,
which may put cost pressure on the plaintiffs. See infra note 185 and accompanying text.
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[10] Furthermore, the granting of an interim injunction may require an
expeditious request for relief by the plaintiff. For instance, should a party
decide to move for a TRO, this will require significant preparation effort
concentrated in a short period of time. Therefore, before traveling down the
slippery slope of litigation, a sophisticated attorney may desire to explore
non-litigation remedies, including mediation and arbitration.
[11] This article has four parts. Part I discusses the granting of interim
injunctive relief. Here, the authors provide an overview of the legal
framework for securing interim injunctive relief in the form of TROs and
preliminary injunctions. In Part II, the practicalities of securing these forms
of relief are discussed. Also included in Part II is a discussion of factors
courts use in determining the appropriateness of the injunctive relief. Part III
provides a discussion of the negotiation process for resolving trademark
disputes in lieu of, or simultaneous with, the filing for interim injunctive
relief. This process will be entered into regardless of whether interim
injunctive relief is granted or denied. Part IV concludes that all clients must
be fully counseled and apprised of all of the remedies, including their
respective costs, available to them prior to filing litigation.
I. GARNERING INTERIM INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
A. What Is an Injunction?
[12] In the context of trademark infringement cases, injunctive relief allows
the plaintiff to prevent any further use of an infringing mark by the defendant
during the pendency of an action.15 Mandatory injunctions “order[] a
responsible party to ‘take action,’” and prohibitory injunctions “‘restrain[]’ a
responsible party from further violati[ons].”16
15

For instance, courts may, pursuant to section 34(d)(1)(A) of the Lanham Act, order
the ex parte seizure of infringing goods bearing counterfeit marks. 15 U.S.C. §
1116(d)(1)(A) (2000). “Such orders may involve the seizure of goods that were produced by
and belong to a foreign entity, but that are located within the United States.” Am. Online,
Inc. v. AOL.org, 259 F. Supp. 2d 449, 456 (E.D. Va. 2003); see, e.g., Bear U.S.A., Inc. v.
Kim, 71 F. Supp. 2d 237, 244- 45 (S.D.N.Y.1999) (describing the issuance of an ex parte
seizure order directed at counterfeit parkas).
16
Meghrig v. KFC W., Inc., 516 U.S. 479, 484 (1996). Preliminary injunctive relief in
the context of trademark infringement is generally thought of as prohibitory, because its
purpose is to prohibit further use of an infringing mark by the defendant pending a trial on
the merits. See MCCARTHY, supra note 11, § 30:30. This distinction can be critical, since
mandatory preliminary injunctions are subject to a higher level of scrutiny than prohibitory
preliminary injunctions, and are therefore more difficult to obtain. See Anderson v. United
States, 612 F.2d 1112, 1114 (9th Cir. 1980) (“Mandatory preliminary relief, which goes well
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[13] In order to obtain injunctive relief in trademark actions, the movant
must demonstrate irreparable injury and inadequacy of legal remedies.17
Furthermore, because injunctive relief is an equitable remedy, it will not be
issued as a matter of course; courts will generally balance the potential effect
of the injunction on each party as well as on the public.18 In trademark
infringement cases, the Lanham Act specifically provides for injunctive relief
“according to the principles of equity and upon such terms as the court may
deem reasonable.”19 In fact, injunctive relief is the most commonly accepted
beyond simply maintaining the status quo pendente lite, is particularly disfavored, and
should not be issued unless the facts and law clearly favor the moving party.”); see also
Cornwell v. Sachs, 99 F. Supp. 2d 695, 703 (E.D. Va. 2000) (“Mandatory preliminary
injunctions do not preserve the status quo and normally should be granted only in those
circumstances when the exigencies of the situation demand such relief.”).
Because the distinction is based upon the effect on the party to be enjoined, it is critical
for the plaintiff to frame its application for relief in prohibitory language, rather than
mandatory language. See SCHWARZER ET AL., supra note 11, § 13:13. For example, a
preliminary injunction ordering a party not to use a trademark pending trial would be
classified as a prohibitory injunction because its effect is to prohibit the enjoined party from
action, while a preliminary injunction ordering a party to pay royalties pending trial would
be classified as a mandatory injunction because its effect is to compel the enjoined party to
take action. See id.
17
See Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982) (“The Court has
repeatedly held that the basis for injunctive relief in the federal courts has always been
irreparable injury and the inadequacy of legal remedies.”). See also MCCARTHY, supra note
11, § 30:31 (citations omitted); infra note 34 and accompanying text.
18
See Amoco Production Co. v. Village of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531 (1987), which states:
In each case, a court must balance the competing
claims of injury and must consider the effect on each
party of the granting or withholding of the requested
relief. Although particular regard should be given to
the public interest, “[the] grant of jurisdiction to
ensure compliance with a statute hardly suggests an
absolute duty to do so under any and all
circumstances, and a federal judge sitting as
chancellor is not mechanically obligated to grant an
injunction for every violation of law.”
Id. at 542 (quoting Weinberger, 456 U.S. at 313).
19
15 U.S.C. § 1116(a) (2000). The Lanham Act is the federal statutory basis for relief
from trademark infringement; it provides, in pertinent part, that:
[t]he several courts vested with jurisdiction of civil
actions arising under this Act shall have power to
grant injunctions, according to the principles of
equity and upon such terms as the court may deem
reasonable, to prevent the violation of any right of the
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20
remedy for trademark infringement, the Lanham Act being simply the
codification of the traditional remedy.21 The courts have great flexibility in
fashioning injunctive relief in trademark infringement cases, allowing them
to tailor the injunction to fit the facts of the action.22
B. What Is the Primary Purpose of Interim Injunctive Relief?
[14] Although often not listed as a specific requirement for obtaining interim
injunctive relief, maintaining the status quo — the snapshot of time that
registrant of a mark registered in the Patent and
Trademark Office or to prevent a violation under
subsection (a), (c), or (d) of this section 43. Any such
injunction may include a provision directing the
defendant to file with the court and serve on the
plaintiff within thirty days after the service on the
defendant of such injunction, or such extended period
as the court may direct, a report in writing under oath
setting forth in detail the manner and form in which
the defendant has complied with the injunction. Any
such injunction granted upon hearing, after notice to
the defendant, by any district court of the United
States, may be served on the parties against whom
such injunction is granted anywhere in the United
States where they may be found, and shall be
operative and may be enforced by proceedings to
punish for contempt, or otherwise, by the court by
which such injunction was granted, or by any other
United States district court in whose jurisdiction the
defendant may be found.
Id.

20

See MCCARTHY, supra note 11, § 30:1 (discussing the equitable remedy of injunction
as the traditional remedy for unfair competition and trademark infringement cases).
21
See Kelley Blue Book v. Car-Smarts, Inc., 802 F. Supp. 278, 293 (C.D. Cal. 1992).
22
According to the court in Kelley Blue Book:
[i]n trademark cases, the courts are given flexibility
in fashioning injunctive relief, and “the scope of the
injunction to be entered depends upon the manner in
which plaintiff is harmed, the possible means by
which that precise harm can be avoided, the viability
of the defense raised, and the relative inconvenience
that would be caused to defendant by each of the
several means of avoidance.”
Id. at 293-94 (quoting J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 30:3 (2d ed. 1984)).
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immediately preceded the dispute between the plaintiff and the defendant —
is the primary purpose of interim injunctive relief.23 In other words, the
plaintiff must show that a TRO or preliminary injunction will restore the last
non-contested state of affairs between the two parties.24 Although forms of
preliminary injunctive relief that would alter the status quo, such as
mandatory injunctions, are not automatically denied, they carry a heavier
burden of persuasion.25
[15] In the context of trademark infringement cases, the status quo to be
preserved by the injunction is the state of affairs that existed prior to the
defendant’s use of the contested trademark.26 This, of course, is usually
exactly what the plaintiff seeks pending a trial on the merits.
C. Forms of Interim Injunctive Relief
1. Temporary Restraining Order
[16] A TRO is a provisional remedy. It can be issued under narrow
circumstances without notice to the opposing party or that party’s counsel.
The purpose of the TRO is to maintain the status quo and prevent irreparable
harm pending a hearing on the moving party’s application for preliminary
injunctive relief.27 A TRO is effective for a limited period of time, usually
ten calendar days, unless good cause is shown or the parties agree
otherwise.28
23

See Tanner Motor Livery, Ltd. v. Avis, Inc., 316 F.2d 804, 808 (9th Cir. 1963) (“It is
so well settled as not to require citation of authority that the usual function of a preliminary
injunction is to preserve the status quo ante litem pending a determination of the action on
the merits.”); see also Six Clinics Holding Corp., II v. Cafcomp Sys., Inc., 119 F.3d 393, 400
(6th Cir. 1997) (“The purpose of a preliminary injunction is merely to preserve the relative
positions of the parties until a trial on the merits can be held.”).
24
See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Free Sewing Mach. Co., 256 F.2d 806, 808, (7th Cir.
1958) (“The status quo is the last uncontested status which preceded the pending
controversy.”); see also Dominion Video Satellite, Inc. v. Echostar Satellite Corp., 269 F.3d
1149, 1155 (10th Cir. 2001); GoTo.com, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 202 F.3d 1199, 1210 (9th
Cir. 2000).
25
See Tom Doherty Assocs. v. Saban Entm’t, Inc., 60 F.3d 27, 33-34 (2d Cir. 1995).
26
See Earth Tech. Corp. v. Envtl. Research & Tech., Inc., No. 82-6375 AWT, 1983 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 18316, at *16 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 23, 1983).
27
See Clements Wire and Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 589 F.2d 894, 896-97 (5th Cir. 1979); see
also Nat’l City Bank v. Battisti, 581 F.2d 565, 567-68 (6th Cir. 1977).
28
FED. R. CIV. P. 65(b); see Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Bhd. of Teamsters Local 70,
415 U.S. 423, 438-39 (1974). Upon ordering the TRO, the court will likely enter an Order to
Show Cause why a preliminary injunction should issue. In addition, the restrained party is
also provided an opportunity, upon notice, to move for the dissolution or modification of the
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[17] A party seeking a TRO must make a persuasive showing of irreparable
harm and demonstrate a likelihood of prevailing on the merits.29 The single
most important factor that courts examine in determining whether to grant a
TRO is the exigency of the circumstances.30 Exigency requires a showing
that immediate and irreparable injury, loss or damage will result to the
movant, unless the non-moving party is restrained.31 Thus, the plaintiff must
show that it is acting quickly to obtain a TRO. If the plaintiff waits too long
to bring suit or to seek interim relief, the court may conclude that there is not
a pressing need for an immediate prohibition order.
[18] There are no set rules on how quickly the movant must file for a TRO.32
The exigency of the circumstances is decided on a case-by-case basis. Courts
examine the exigency of the circumstances from the plaintiff’s perspective,
and from the public’s perspective when concern for the public is a factor.
2. Preliminary Injunction
[19] A preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy issued prior to final
disposition of the litigation. The function of a preliminary injunction is to
preserve the status quo and to prevent irreparable loss of rights prior to a final
judgment on the merits.33 The requirements for preliminary injunctive relief
differ in each circuit. Generally, courts consider the following factors when
deciding whether to grant preliminary injunctive relief in trademark
infringement cases: (1) the exigency of the circumstances, which includes the
TRO. See Clements Wire and Mfg. Co., 589 F.2d at 896; see also Nat’l City Bank, 581 F.2d
at 567.
29
New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 434 U.S. 1345, 1347 n.2 (1977).
30
“Exigency” is defined as “[a] state of urgency; a situation requiring immediate
action.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 614 (8th ed. 2004).
31
A TRO should not issue under Rule 65(b) unless immediate irreparable injury is
threatened. See In re Vuitton et Fils S.A., 606 F.2d 1, 4 (2d Cir. 1979); Ragold, Inc. v.
Ferrero, U.S.A., Inc., 506 F. Supp. 117, 123 n.7 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
32
See SCHWARZER ET AL., supra note 11, § 13:145. Still, the earlier the better:
An application for preliminary injunction may be
filed at any time. However, as with TRO
applications, it is always wise to request such relief
as early as practicable. Delay may cause the court to
conclude there is no “immediate” threat of injury and
that the matter can wait until a trial on the merits.
Id.

33

Sierra On-Line, Inc. v. Phoenix Software, Inc., 739 F.2d 1415, 1422 (9th Cir. 1984);
see also Faheem-El v. Klincar, 841 F.2d 712, 717 (7th Cir. 1988).
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plaintiff’s irreparable injury; (2) the probability of success on the merits of
the action at trial; (3) a determination of the parties’ relative hardships that
would result from the decision; (4) protection of the public interest; and (5)
maintenance of the status quo pendente lite.34 However, unlike a TRO, any
delay in filing for preliminary injunctive relief is but one of several factors
courts consider when deciding whether to grant this provisional remedy.35
II. PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF INTERIM INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
[20] Preliminary injunctive relief may be had in two forms: TRO and
preliminary injunction. Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
provide the general rules for obtaining either a TRO or a preliminary

34

See MCCARTHY, supra note 11, § 30:31 (discussing how the moving party must
demonstrate that: (1) there is a probability of success on the merits at the ultimate trial; (2) it
will be irreparably harmed unless injunction is issued; (3) interim injunctive relief will
preserve status quo; (4) hardships balance in its favor; and (5) an injunction may be
necessary to protect third parties); see also SCHWARZER ET AL., supra note 11, § 13:44-45
(discussing the “traditional test,” which requires: (1) a fair chance of success on the merits;
(2) a significant threat of irreparable injury; (3) a balance of hardships that tips minimally in
the plaintiff’s favor; and (4) that the public interest favors preliminary injunctive relief, as
well as the “alternative test,” which requires the moving party to show either “[a]
combination of probable success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable injury; or
[s]erious questions as to these matters and the balance of hardships tips sharply in [the]
plaintiff’s favor”).
35
See Sandra Edelman, Delay in Filing Preliminary Injunction Motions: Update 2002,
92 TRADEMARK REP. 647 (2002), who asserts that:
when a case is weak on the merits, the court is more
likely to find the plaintiff’s delay to be inexcusable,
providing a clear and convenient reason for denying
the relief requested. Conversely, when a defendant
has acted intentionally or engaged in other egregious
conduct, the court is likely to de-emphasize the issue
of delay and be more tolerant of a plaintiff's failure to
move promptly.
Id. at 649 (citations omitted).
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36
injunction, the specific procedural rules must be gleaned from case law and
local rules.37
A. Temporary Restraining Order
1. Generally
[21] A TRO is the quickest way for a plaintiff to halt a defendant’s use of an
infringing trademark.38 A TRO is essentially an order from a court to a
defendant to immediately cease any further use of an infringing mark; its sole
purpose is to preserve the status quo pending a hearing on the plaintiff’s
application for a preliminary injunction.39 Generally, the first step in
obtaining a TRO, as is the case in any lawsuit, is to file the complaint for
infringement.40
36

See FED. R. CIV. P. 65. Rule 65(a) of the Federal Rules discusses the standards for the
granting of a preliminary injunction; Rule 65(b) discusses the granting of a TRO; Rule 65(c)
discusses the security or bond the court must consider ordering to be posted when the TRO
or injunction issues; Rule 65(d) discusses the form and scope of the TRO or injunction; and
Rule 65(e) discusses the effect of Rule 65 on other statutes. Id. Finally, Rule 65.1 discusses
surety liability. FED. R. CIV. P. 65.1.
37
SCHWARZER ET AL., supra note 11, § 13:85. For practitioners, there are several
critical steps to take when considering procedural strategy in seeking preliminary injunctive
relief: first, the practitioner should become familiar with Rule 65; second, the practitioner
should become familiar with the local court rules concerning preliminary injunctive relief;
and third, the practitioner should contact the relevant court clerk to get informal information
on the judge’s procedural preferences. Id. § 13:85.1 to :86.
38
See, e.g., Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Andy’s Sportswear, Inc., No. C-96-2783, 1996 WL
657219, at *1543 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 1996) (granting BUDWEISER mark owner a TRO
prohibiting defendant’s use of “Buttweiser” on t-shirts); Giacalone v. Network Solutions,
Inc., No. C-96-20434, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20807, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 1996)
(granting owner of the website “ty.com” a TRO against Ty, Inc. on ground that defendant
was unlawfully attempting to extend its scope of trademark registration to areas where it had
no legal right to protection).
39
See 11A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 2951 (3d ed. 1998). The distinguishing aspect of a TRO is that it is issued
without affording the party to be restrained the opportunity to argue against it, and
sometimes without even notice to the party that the TRO is being sought. See id. Foreign
jurisdictions also understand the exigency of issuing a TRO. See Sandy Meng-Shan Liu,
After WTO Accession: China’s Dilemma with the Trafficking of Fakes, 93 TRADEMARK REP.
1153, 1173 (2003) (“[A] temporary restraining order can . . . be obtained to preserve pre-trial
evidence if the registrant can prove that evidence may be destroyed, lost, or unlikely to be
obtained in the future.”) (citations omitted).
40
See Stewart v. United States Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 762 F.2d 193, 198
(2d Cir. 1985) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 65 (a)(2)) (“Only after an action has been commenced
can preliminary injunctive relief be obtained.”). However, when the need for swift relief is
urgent, such relief may be granted even before a complaint is filed. See, e.g., Studebaker
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[22] The application for the TRO is generally filed simultaneously with the
complaint.42 In addition to the complaint and application, the plaintiff should
submit a legal brief outlining the relevant legal issues, as well as an Order to
Show Cause (“OSC”) as to why a preliminary injunction should issue.43 The
brief should be succinct  since the court will have very little time to
analyze it  yet complete, explaining in detail why relief should be granted
immediately instead of following a trial on the merits.44 Furthermore, the
brief must address the relevant requirements for preliminary injunctive relief
as discussed below,45 particularly the facts showing immediate and
irreparable injury.46
[23] The plaintiff must couch its TRO request as an urgent and compelling
need for immediate relief.47 It must show such immediacy through
“irreparable injury.”48 Irreparable injury in trademark cases is often defined
as a “‘high probability of confusion, [such that] injury [is] irreparable in the

Corp. v. Gittlin, 360 F.2d 692, 694 (2d Cir. 1966) (“Because of the exigencies of time usual
in contests for corporate control . . . . the court could properly treat the affidavit as a
complaint and the order to show cause as requiring an early answer.”).
41
This application is referred to in some courts as a “motion for temporary restraining
order.” See, e.g., E.D. CAL. L.R. 65-231(c).
42
See SCHWARZER ET AL., supra note 11, § 13:91. However, unlike permanent
injunctions or declaratory judgments, which require prayer for relief within the complaint,
preliminary injunctive relief can be requested for the first time by motion. See Dillard v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 961 F.2d 1148, 1155 (5th Cir. 1992).
43
See SCHWARZER ET AL., supra note 11, § 13:92; see also J. Joseph Bainton,
Reflections on the Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984: Score a Few for the Good
Guys, 82 TRADEMARK REP. 1, 19-20 (1992) (explaining that if an injured party desires to
move for ex parte seizure and impoundment order, it should present affidavits, evidence,
and an Order to Show Cause for issuance of Temporary Restraining Order, Preliminary
Injunction, and Accelerated Discovery).
44
SCHWARZER ET AL., supra note 11, § 13:93. Likewise, if the defendant is provided
with the opportunity to submit a brief in opposition to the issuance of the TRO, it should file
a similarly succinct and complete brief as to why the TRO should not issue.
45
See infra notes 59-75, 85-95 and accompanying text.
46
See infra notes 47-58 and accompanying text.
47
See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 39, § 2951 (“The issuance of an ex parte
temporary restraining order is an emergency procedure and is appropriate only when the
applicant is in need of immediate relief.”) (citations omitted); see also FED. R. CIV. P.
65(b).
48
See Mountain Med. Equip., Inc. v. Healthdyne, Inc., 582 F. Supp. 846, 848 (D. Colo.
1984) (“Although there is no black letter definition of what constitutes an irreparable injury,
the essence of the concept requires a substantial threat of harm to the movant that cannot be
compensated by money.”) (citations omitted).
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sense that it may not be fully compensable in damages.’”49 A plaintiff can
demonstrate irreparable injury by showing a likelihood of confusion between
the plaintiff’s mark and the defendant’s mark.50 In order to demonstrate a
likelihood of confusion, a plaintiff can allege numerous trademark
infringement claims, including false advertising,51 unfair competition,52
49

Nat’l Bd. of Young Men’s Christian Ass’ns v. Flint Young Men’s Christian Ass’n,
764 F.2d 199, 201 (6th Cir. 1985) (quoting Omega Import. Corp. v. Petri-Kine Camera Co.,
451 F.2d 1190, 1195 (2d Cir. 1971)).
50
According to Lanham Act § 32(1), 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (2000):
[a]ny person who shall, without the consent of the
registrant  (a) use in commerce any reproduction,
counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a
registered mark in connection with the sale, offering
for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or
services on or in connection with which such use is
likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive . . . shall be liable in a civil action by the
registrant . . . .
In trademark infringement, a majority of courts hold that a showing of likelihood of
confusion is sufficient to demonstrate irreparable injury. See MCCARTHY, supra note 11, §
30:47. An immediate loss of reputation is an unquantifiable loss that is difficult, if not
impossible, to compensate through an award of money damages. See Rodeo Collection, Ltd.
v. W. Seventh, 812 F.2d 1215, 1220 (9th Cir. 1987) (“Once the plaintiff in an infringement
action has established a likelihood of confusion, it is ordinarily presumed that the plaintiff
will suffer irreparable harm if injunctive relief does not issue.”). Trademark infringement
injuries are presumed to be irreparable because “it is virtually impossible to ascertain the
precise economic consequences of intangible harms, such as damage to reputation and loss
of goodwill, caused by such violations.” Abbott Labs. v. Mead Johnson & Co., 971 F.2d 6,
16 (7th Cir. 1992). Other courts view a showing of likelihood of confusion as merely
persuasive evidence of irreparable injury. See, e.g., Am. Bd. of Psychiatry & Neurology,
Inc. v. Johnson-Powell, 129 F.3d 1, 4 n.4 (1st Cir. 1997) (“We say merely that such evidence
does not amount to a legal presumption; it is proof that, like other factual evidence, may be
rebutted by other facts and circumstances.”).
51
See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A)-(B) (2000). In order to make a colorable claim for
false advertising, a plaintiff must plead and prove that the defendant uses a designation or
false designation of origin in interstate commerce, and in connection with goods or services,
when the designation is likely to cause confusion, deception or mistake as to: “[(1)] the
affiliation, connection, or association of [defendant] with another person, or [(2)] as to the
origin, sponsorship, or approval of [defendant’s] goods, services, or commercial activities by
another person,” and the plaintiff has been or is likely to be damaged by these acts. Id.
“Remedies for false advertising include: a preliminary and final injunction; corrective
advertising; and monetary recovery.” See MCCARTHY, supra note 11, § 27:13 (citations
omitted).
52
“The law of unfair competition generally protects consumers and competitors from
deceptive or unethical conduct in commerce.” Mars, Inc. v. Kabushiki-Kaisha Nippon
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dilution, incontestability of the right to use the mark under certain
conditions,54 and breach of contract, all of which would cause the plaintiff to
lose control of its reputation as to the goods or services improperly marked
by the defendant.
[24] Once the court determines that a plaintiff can lay claim to a likelihood
of confusion, the court then examines whether the plaintiff has established
that it has a likelihood of success on the merits in the underlying lawsuit
sufficient to establish irreparable injury.55 When trademark infringement is at
issue, this showing is easily made in those jurisdictions following the rule
that a demonstration of likely confusion or dilution creates a presumption of
irreparable harm.56

Conlux, 24 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1994). “Unfair competition is a commercial tort.”
MCCARTHY, supra note 11, § 1:8. It includes within its spectrum claims for the
infringement of the right of publicity, which is the legal right to control the commercial use
of an individual’s identity. Id. § 28:1. The infringement of the right of publicity is both a
commercial tort and a form of unfair competition. Id.
53
See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1)(A)-(H) (2000). In Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v.
Marvel Enterprises, Inc., 277 F.3d. 253 (2d Cir. 2002), a motion picture studio that produced
a film based on a particular set of comic book characters brought an action against the
studio’s licensor, publishers of comic books, and producers of a related television series
based on them. It unsuccessfully sought an injunction on the basis that the television series
violated the studio’s contractual rights and its rights under the Lanham Act. Id. at 257-60.
54
See 15 U.S.C. § 1065 (2000); see, e.g., Re/Max N. Cent., Inc. v. Cook, 272 F.3d 424,
433 (7th Cir. 2001) (granting plaintiff a preliminary injunction against the franchisee for its
continued use of the Re/Max mark upon the expiration of the franchise agreement).
55
See Perry Viscounty et al., Arguing Likelihood of Confusion: The Importance of
Trademark Experience and Forensic Skill, CLIENTTIMES (Thomson & Thomson, North
Quincy, Mass.), Dec. 2003, at 3 (“Although various courts and trademark examiners may
believe they are employing the same tests in determining whether there is a likelihood of
confusion, their analysis is inherently subjective. For that reason, different decision makers
often reach contrary results, even when presented with the same or similar facts.”).
56
See e.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456, 469 (7th Cir. 2000)
(“Irreparable harm is generally presumed in cases of trademark infringement and dilution.”);
Microsoft Corp. v. Action Software, 136 F. Supp. 2d 735, 739 (N.D. Ohio 2001)
(“Irreparable harm is . . . presumed in actions for . . . trademark infringement.”); Villanova
Univ. v. Villanova Alumni Educ. Found., 123 F. Supp. 2d 293, 310 (E.D. Pa. 2000)
(“Irreparable injury follows a showing of likelihood of confusion ‘as a matter of course.’”)
(quoting Opticians Assoc. of Am. v. Indep. Opticians of Am., 920 F.2d 187, 195 (3d Cir.
1990)); Davidoff & CIE SA v. PLD Int’l Corp., No. 00-2635, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19243,
at *14 (S.D. Fla. 2000) (“Irreparable injury is presumed for trademark infringement.”);
Deborah Heart & Lung Ctr. v. Children of the World Found., Ltd., 99 F. Supp. 2d 481, 493
(D.N.J. 2000) (“Since infringement of trademark deprives the owner of control over its
goodwill, the injury to goodwill is by its nature irreparable . . . .”).

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology
Volume XI, Issue 1
[25] The court may also balance the harm suffered by the defendant if the
order were issued against the injury the movant would suffer if the
application for the TRO were denied.57 In addition, it may be appropriate for
the court to consider the effect of the requested order on the public interest.58
As such, a plaintiff moving for injunctive relief must painstakingly prepare
its papers, including a complete marshalling of the facts and accompanying
declarations. In some circumstances, a plaintiff must also be prepared to
present its witnesses to the court, should the matter be heard.
[26] However, the more complex the matter, the less inclined the court will
be to grant a TRO, due to the factual analysis that must be undertaken. When
the plaintiff presents an exhaustive discussion of the facts in its TRO papers,
the court will be more inclined to issue an OSC. Therefore, the plaintiff’s
presentation of its application for a TRO must be succinct, compelling, and
without a lengthy factual discussion.
2. Supporting Evidence
[27] Along with the complaint, application, and brief, the plaintiff should
submit any relevant evidence supporting its brief, particularly if the plaintiff
is seeking a TRO without notice to the party to be restrained.59 Generally,
detailed declarations and affidavits are the most effective means of providing
57

WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 39, § 2951 (“This balancing of the hardships approach
is fairly common, particularly when one of the parties is a governmental unit.”) (citations
omitted).
58
Id. (citing Jackson v. NFL, 802 F. Supp. 226 (D. Minn. 1992)).
59
FED. R. CIV. P. 65(b) states, in relevant part, that:
[a] temporary restraining order may be granted
without written or oral notice . . . only if (1) it clearly
appears from specific facts shown by affidavit or by
the verified complaint that immediate and irreparable
injury, loss, or damage will result to the applicant
before the adverse party or the party’s attorney can be
heard in opposition, and (2) the applicant’s attorney
certifies to the court in writing the efforts, if any,
which have been made to give the notice and the
reasons supporting the claim that notice should not be
required.
But see Ziegman Prods., Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 496 F. Supp. 965, 967 (E.D. Wis. 1980)
(holding that a TRO may be denied on the grounds that inadequate effort was made to notify
the non-moving party).
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60
factual support. For example, affidavits from consumers showing actual
confusion as to the marks can be an effective way of showing likelihood of
confusion.61 In addition, because of the time constraints involved, courts are
generally lenient in accepting various forms of evidence, such as deposition
testimony or counsel declarations, including evidence that would be
inadmissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence.62 However, the court has
discretion to determine the weight such evidence will carry, and tends to look
upon inadmissible evidence with skepticism, especially where no notice is
provided to the defendant.63 Therefore, the affidavit must be based on
60

For instance, in LTT International Development and Trading Corp. v. ABC
Distributing, Inc., No. CV 00-00776 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2000) (unreported case in which Mr.
Speiss, co-author, participated as counsel), both the plaintiff and defendant were juvenile toy
and home furnishing manufacturers. The plaintiff alleged trademark and copyright
infringement, as well as violations of state unfair competition laws due to the unauthorized
creation of knock-off children’s stuffed bear, duck, and elephant toy stools. The plaintiff
moved for a TRO. In support of its application, it filed declarations evidencing actual
confusion, including the testimony of a distributor that purchased the defendant’s products,
believing them to be associated with the plaintiff. The plaintiff also filed declarations from
corporate executives regarding their conversations with wholesalers who exhibited confusion
between the products. These executives discussed the loss of goodwill in their products due
to the “cheap” quality of the defendant’s products. As a result, the court granted the TRO.
61
See, e.g., Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Safeway Props., Inc., 307 F.2d 495, 498, 500 (2d
Cir. 1962) (upholding the lower court’s grant of a preliminary injunction based on consumer
affidavits showing confusion as to affiliation).
62
See Sierra Club v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 992 F.2d 545, 551 (5th Cir. 1993) (“[A]t
the preliminary injunction stage, the procedures in the district court are less formal, and the
district court may rely on otherwise inadmissible evidence, including hearsay evidence.”);
see also Flynt Distrib. Co. v. Harvey, 734 F.2d 1389, 1394 (9th Cir. 1984) (“The urgency of
obtaining a preliminary injunction necessitates a prompt determination . . . . The trial court
may give even inadmissible evidence some weight, when to do so serves the purpose of
preventing irreparable harm before trial.”).
Likewise, in defending against the issuance of a TRO, a defendant may submit
deposition testimony or counsel declarations, including evidence that would be inadmissible
under the Federal Rules of Evidence. It is best to consult all appropriate Federal and local
rules, as well as case law, that govern the submission of evidence prior to submission.
63
See SCHWARZER ET AL. supra note 11, § 13:107. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 39,
§ 2952, discusses the use of affidavits in support of a TRO:
There does not seem to be any case law defining the
applicable standards for judging the quality and
character of an affidavit offered in support of a
motion under Rule 65(b). Since a temporary
restraining order generally is sought on short notice,
in a situation of pressing need, and Rule 65(b)
expressly permits its issuance on the presentation of a
verified complaint, it probably is unsound to hold the
affidavits to too rigorous a standard. Thus for
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personal knowledge and state the facts supporting the position of the movant
clearly and specifically.64
[28] A TRO may also be issued on the basis of a verified complaint.65 This
is not a recommended strategy, however, since pleadings are generally too
conclusion-driven and generalized in scope.66 In addition, rather than file for
a TRO, a movant may decide to informally provide the non-moving party
with the evidence it intends to file in support of the application for a TRO, so
that the non-moving party can evaluate whether it desires to immediately
initiate settlement discussions.67
3. The Movant Should Submit a Proposed TRO, Including a Provision
for a Bond to be Posted
[29] The movant should also submit a proposed TRO, including a provision
for a bond. The proposed TRO, according to Rule 65, should set forth the
reason for its issuance and specify the exact actions to be enjoined, or items
to be seized.68 These provisions are meant to protect the enjoined “by
example, it would be inappropriate to apply the
standard for an affidavit offered on a summary
judgment motion that is prescribed by Rule 56(e).
64
See SCHWARZER ET AL. supra note 11, § 13:107.
65
See FED. R. CIV. P. 65(b) (“A temporary restraining order may be granted . . . only if
(1) it clearly appears from specific facts shown by affidavit or by the verified complaint . . .
.”) (emphasis added); cf. Brown v. Bernstein, 49 F. Supp. 497, 499 (D.C. Pa. 1943) (holding
that an affidavit alleging facts was sufficient to constitute irreparable injury and met the
requirement of Rule 65(b) even though the complaint was not verified).
66
SCHWARZER ET AL., supra note 11, § 13:104.
67
See City Fin. v. Citigroup, Inc., No. 99-CV-1323 (C.D. Cal., Oct. 26, 1999)
(unreported case in which Mr. Speiss, co-author, participated as counsel). In City Financial,
the plaintiffs alleged that their mark, CITY FINANCIAL, which had a California State
Trademark registration and use over a twenty-year-period, was being infringed through the
use of the CITIFINANCIAL mark by the defendants. The plaintiffs produced several
declarations from confused customers, as well as declarations from company employees
concerning their receipt of telephone calls from employees of Citigroup, who mistakenly
believed they were contacting CITIFINANCIAL. The plaintiffs also retained Michael J.
Wagner, a damages expert, who prepared a report that was utilized as part of the settlement
discussions. The action settled shortly after it was filed.
68
See FED. R. CIV. P. 65(d), which requires that every order granting a restraining
order:
shall set forth the reasons for the issuance; shall be
specific in terms; shall describe in reasonable detail,
and not by reference to the complaint or other
document, the act or acts sought to be restrained; and
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informing them of what they are called upon to do or refrain from doing in
order to comply with the injunction or [TRO].”69
[30] The court must expressly consider the posting of a bond prior to the
issuance of a TRO.70 The bond protects the defendant from damages that
is binding only upon the parties to the action, their
officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys,
and upon those persons in active concert or
participation with them who receive actual notice of
the order by personal service or otherwise.
69

WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 39, § 2955 (citing Schmidt v. Lessard, 414 U.S. 473
(1974)).
70
FED. R. CIV. P. 65(c) states that:
[n]o restraining order or preliminary injunction shall
issue except upon the giving of security by the
applicant, in such sum as the court deems proper, for
the payment of such costs and damages as may be
incurred or suffered by any party who is found to
have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained;
This requirement leaves open the amount of the bond, if any, to be posted. See FED. R. CIV.
P. 65(c). In addition, many district courts have local rules interpreting this requirement.
See, for example, C.D. CAL. L.R. 65-3, which states that:
[n]o bond or undertaking requiring third-party
sureties will be approved unless it bears the names
and addresses of third-party sureties and is
accompanied by a declaration by the surety stating
that: (a) [t]he surety is a resident of the State of
California; (b) [t]he surety who intends to deed real
property as security owns the real property within the
State of California; (c) [t]he security posted by the
surety is worth the amount specified in the bond or
undertaking, over and above just debts and liabilities;
and (d) [t]he property, real or personal, which is to be
conveyed as security, is not exempt from execution
and prejudgment attachment.
In one recent action, the TRO was granted but was not in effect for several months
because the plaintiff failed to post the requisite bond. In Seven Lives, Inc. v. Montoya, No.
00-CV08851 (C.D. Cal., Aug. 21, 2000) (unreported case in which Mr. Speiss, co-author,
participated as counsel), the plaintiff, a regional gourmet cookie and gingerbread house
designer and manufacturer, filed suit against a former employee and his employer, Regal
Baking Company. Both the plaintiff and the defendant bake and “private label” cookies for
specialty coffee companies, major department stores, and catalog companies. The complaint
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may be incurred if it is later determined that the injunction was issued
wrongfully.71 However, the court does have discretion to excuse the bond in
“exceptional” cases.72
[31] The amount of the bond is “such sum as the court deems proper, for the
payment of such costs and damages as may be incurred or suffered by any
party who is found to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained.”73
alleged that the defendants had violated the trade dress and copyrights contained in the
cookie and ginger bread house designs made by the plaintiff because they made similarlooking Christmas and Chanukah holiday cookies, as well as other holiday-themed cookies.
The plaintiff moved for, and received, a TRO. The court simultaneously issued an Order to
Show Cause why a preliminary injunction would not issue. The TRO, however, was not in
effect until December 7, 2000, because the plaintiff did not post the required $3,000 bond
until that date.
71
See Ty, Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd., 292 F.3d 512, 516 (7th Cir. 2002) (stating that the
purpose of a bond, in the event that the defendant prevails on the merits, is to compensate
him for harm caused by an injunction entered before the final decision); see also WRIGHT &
MILLER, supra note 39, § 2954 (“The purpose of this provision is to enable a restrained or
enjoined party to secure indemnification for the costs, usually not including attorney’s fees,
and pecuniary injury that may accrue during the period in which a wrongfully issued
equitable order remains in effect.”) (citations omitted).
72
SCHWARZER ET AL., supra note 11, § 13:194. “But these [cases] are few and far
between: ‘The instances in which a bond may not be required are so rare that the requirement
is almost mandatory.’” Id. (citing Frank’s GMC Truck Ctr., Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 847
F.2d 100, 103 (3d Cir. 1988)). “However, other courts are more liberal, treating Rule 65(c)’s
language ‘in such sum as the court deems proper’ as making the bond requirement entirely
discretionary, allowing the court to waive the bond requirement in any case.” Id. § 13:194;
accord Moltan Co. v. Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc., 55 F.3d 1171, 1176 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding
that no bond was required where the trial court found strength in the applicant’s action and
strong public interest was involved); Pharm. Soc’y, Inc. v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Soc. Servs.,
50 F.3d 1168, 1174-75 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding that the public interest was served by ensuring
that the state complied with federal law); Scherr v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 1027, 1035 (7th Cir.
1972) (finding that the plaintiffs’ likelihood of success was particularly strong); OrantesHernandez v. Smith, 541 F. Supp. 351, 385 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (granting an injunction in an
action brought by an indigent plaintiff).
73
FED. R. CIV. P. 65(c). WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 39, claims that:
[a]s a result of this passage, the discretion permitted a
federal court sitting in equity is available to a court in
setting the amount of security that is required by Rule
65(c).
Accordingly, the judge usually will fix security in
an amount that covers the potential incidental and
consequential costs as well as either the losses the
unjustly enjoined or restrained party will suffer
during the period he is prohibited from engaging in
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Specifically, that sum is whatever amount the court deems necessary to cover
the costs and damages likely to be incurred by the party being restrained
between the date of the issuance of the TRO and the date of the hearing on
the preliminary injunction.74 If unforeseen costs or damages arise after the
preliminary injunction has been issued, the court may increase the amount of
required security on its own or at the request of the enjoined party.75
4. Notice
[32] The plaintiff must attempt to give the party to be restrained notice of the
impending application in order to allow said party the chance to be present
and argue its case when the application is heard.76 The notice, either written
or oral, should inform the party to be restrained of: (1) the plaintiff’s
intention to apply for a TRO; (2) the date and time of the application hearing,
along with any changes that may occur; and (3) the nature of the relief
requested.77 If no notice is given, the plaintiff must submit, along with the
complaint, application, legal brief, supporting evidence, and proposed TRO,
a certified account of efforts to notify either the defendant or its counsel of
the application for a TRO.78
certain activities or the complainant’s unjust
enrichment caused by his adversary being improperly
enjoined or restrained.
Id. § 2954 (citations omitted).
74
SCHWARZER ET AL., supra note 11, § 13:122.
75
Id. § 13:201.
76
See Arvida v. Sugarman, 259 F.2d 428, 429 (2d Cir. 1958) (“The reason underlying
the rule is that failure to give notice and a chance to be heard offends our customary notions
of fair play and violates the spirit and the letter of the Federal Rules, except in the
extraordinary cases therein provided for.”). From a strategic standpoint, notice should not be
given until the moving papers are as close to prepared as possible, if not fully prepared.
77
See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 39, § 2952 (“The method of giving the written
notice referred to in [Rule 65(b) of the Federal Rules] is not described in the rule itself.
However, Rule 5(b) provides a general procedure for serving papers on opposing parties
subsequent to [filing] the original complaint and the practice under that rule should be
applicable to . . . Rule 65(b) . . . .”).
78
See FED. R. CIV. P. 65(b) which states, in relevant part, that:
[a] temporary restraining order may be granted
without written or oral notice . . . only if . . . (2) the
applicant’s attorney certifies to the court in writing
the efforts, if any, which have been made to give the
notice and the reasons supporting the claim that
notice should not be required.
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[33] Most local rules make it clear that, absent extraordinary circumstances,
a TRO will not be issued without either actual notice or a sufficient showing
of attempted notice.79 Extraordinary circumstances include situations where
notice is impossible, such as when the opposing party cannot be found, or
where such notice would render the litigation “fruitless,” such as when the
opposing party has a history of disposing of evidence.80 An inadequate
showing of attempted notice can prevent the granting of an otherwise
meritorious TRO application.81 Therefore, such attempts should be made
repeatedly and in good faith, and should be meticulously documented for the
court.82
5. Order to Show Cause
[34] When a TRO is sought, even if not granted, the preliminary injunction
hearing is generally set by an OSC, rather than through the usual method of
notice of motion for preliminary injunction.83 An OSC is “[a]n order
The plaintiff must also submit supporting evidence as discussed supra notes 59-67 and
accompanying text. See also Gen. Motors Corp. v. Buha, 623 F.2d 455, 457-58 (6th Cir.
1980); WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 39, § 2951.
79
See SCHWARZER ET AL., supra note 11, § 13:98.
80
Id. In order to demonstrate that the defendant has a history of disposing of evidence:
[the] plaintiffs must show that [the] defendants would have
disregarded a direct court order and disposed of the goods
within the time it would take for a hearing.
The applicant must support such assertions by
showing that the adverse party has a history of disposing
of evidence or violating court orders or that persons similar
to the adverse party have such a history.
First Tech. Safety Sys., Inc. v. Depinet, 11 F.3d 641, 650-51 (6th Cir. 1993);
see also Fimab-Finanziara Maglificio Biellese Fratelli Fila S.P.A. v. Helio
Imp./Exp., Inc. 601 F. Supp. 1, 2-3, 7-9 (S.D. Fla. 1983) (finding that where
the disappearance of counterfeit goods and related records was possible if
notice of the proceedings were to be given, an ex parte TRO was available
and would be granted).
81
See Ziegman Prods., Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 496 F. Supp. 965, 967 (E.D. Wis.
1980) (finding that efforts to notify only two deputy city attorneys was inadequate because
notice could have been given to any of the twenty-five attorneys in the office).
82
In addition, the restrained party must be informed of the issuance of the notice as
soon as possible. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 39, § 2951.
83
SCHWARZER ET AL., supra note 11, § 13:124. Many district courts have local rules
interpreting this rule. See, e.g., C.D. CAL. L.R. 65-1 (“If the TRO is denied, the Court may
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directing a party to appear in court and explain why the party took (or failed
to take) some action or why the court should or should not grant some
relief.”84 In other words, the plaintiff should submit, along with other
paperwork, a proposed OSC with blanks for fixing the time and date for a
hearing on the motion for preliminary injunction.
6. Procedure for Application
[35] Because of its urgent nature, a TRO application should be filed
immediately upon learning of the infringement of the mark in question.
Any delay may result in some question as to the urgency or irreparable
nature of the injury.85 When the TRO application is filed along with the
complaint, generally the complaint and accompanying paperwork (as
discussed above) are filed with the district court clerk after attempts to
give notice have been made.86
[36] File-stamped copies are then taken to the courtroom clerk or secretary
of the judge to whom the case has been assigned.87 If the opposing counsel
has appeared, copies are given to them as well.88 If the case has already been
filed, the assigned clerk or secretary should be contacted before filing the
application so that they can determine when the application may be
considered.89 In this case, notice should be attempted when such time is first
known.90 The clerk or secretary should be consulted with any questions as to
availability of the judge.91
[37] Generally, ex parte matters are heard in between other matters, so
counsel for both sides should be prepared to wait at the courthouse until the
court has time to consider the application.92 When that time comes, the judge
set the hearing on the order to show cause without regard to the twenty-one (21) days notice
of motion requirement of L.R. 6-1.”).
84
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1130 (8th ed. 2004).
85
But see Ryan v. Volpone Stamp Co., 107 F. Supp. 2d 369, 404 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
(finding that a delay of “slightly over two months” was insufficient to bar relief).
86
See SCHWARZER ET AL., supra note 11, § 13:109. Many district courts have local
rules interpreting this requirement. See, e.g., C.D. CAL. L.R. 65-1 (“A party seeking a
temporary restraining order (“TRO”) must submit an application, a proposed TRO, and a
proposed order to show cause why a preliminary injunction should not issue.”).
87
SCHWARZER ET AL., supra note 11, § 13:109.
88
Id.
89
Id. § 13:110.
90
See id.
91
See id. § 13:111.
92
Id. § 13:112.
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will normally ask counsel into chambers to discuss the application after
reviewing the papers.93 Some judges require the matter to be heard by a law
clerk or magistrate who reports their recommendations. Other judges will
review the matter solely on the paperwork, and still others will give the
application a full hearing in open court.94 Of course, in an oral argument the
plaintiff should explain the immediate and irreparable harm it will suffer
prior to the preliminary injunction hearing.95
7. Issuance and Duration
[38] When a TRO is issued without notice, it expires automatically within
the time set out in the order, not to exceed ten days.96 If no date is fixed in
the order itself, the duration is deemed to be ten days.97 This duration may
be extended for an additional equal term upon a showing of good cause or by
consent of both parties.98 “Good cause” may exist when: “(1) plaintiff has
been unable to serve defendant with the TRO; (2) it is not possible to obtain a
hearing date within the [ten]-day period; or (3) discovery needed for the
preliminary injunction cannot be completed within the [ten]-day period.”99
[39] Despite any such showing of good cause, a TRO cannot remain in
effect for more than twenty days without the consent of the enjoined party.100
93

Id. § 13:113.
Id.
95
See id. § 13:114.
96
FED. R. CIV. P. 65(b).
97
Id.; see Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Myers, 439 F.2d 834, 836 (3d Cir. 1971).
98
FED. R. CIV. P. 65(b); see Hudson v. Barr, 3 F.3d 970, 973-74 (6th Cir. 1993).
99
SCHWARZER ET AL., supra note 11, § 13:129. Compare id. with WRIGHT & MILLER,
supra note 39, § 2953, which states:
94

Although there does not seem to be any case law on
what constitutes “good cause” for purposes of
extending a Rule 65(b) order, a showing that the
grounds for originally granting the temporary
restraining order continue to exist should be
sufficient. The text of Rule 65(b) seems to exclude
any possibility that a temporary restraining order can
remain in force beyond twenty days.
100

See FED. R. CIV. P. 65(b). Consent may be express or implied. SCHWARZER ET AL.,
supra note 11, § 13:131. For example, consent is implied by the enjoined party’s consent to
a continuance of the motion for preliminary injunction hearing date. Id.; see FernandezRoque v. Smith, 671 F.2d 426, 430 (11th Cir. 1982). However, refusal of such continuance
will limit the TRO to its twenty-day maximum. See Hudson, 3 F.3d at 974-75.
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If the court does continue the TRO beyond the twenty-day limit without the
consent of the enjoined party, the TRO should be treated as a preliminary
injunction and will likely be immediately appealed by the enjoined party.101
[40] Rule 65 does not set time limits for TRO’s issued with notice, though
most courts simply adopt the same time limits for TRO’s issued without
notice.102 Other courts are subject to local rules, and still others impose a
twenty-day limit.103
8. Appeal
[41] Ordinarily, an appeal does not lie from an order granting (or denying) a
TRO.104 However, if the TRO has been extended beyond the twenty-day
limit, it is treated as a preliminary injunction and may be appealed,105 even if
the enjoined party consented to the extension.106 Furthermore, when a TRO
101

See Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 86-88 (1974). Unlike a TRO, a preliminary
injunction is appealable. See infra notes 104-10 and accompanying text (discussing appeals
of TROs). Appealing such an improperly extended TRO is the proper course of action, since
violating even an improperly extended TRO may subject the violating party to contempt.
See Levine v. Comcoa, Ltd., 70 F.3d 1191, 1193 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding the violating
party in contempt after notice and an opportunity to be heard). Note that where there has
been no notice to the parties and no hearing on the various factors involved in considering a
preliminary injunction, a TRO continued past the time limit automatically ceases. Id. at
1193 n.7.
102
See, e.g., Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Bhd. of Teamsters Local 70, 415 U.S. 423,
433 n.7 (1974).
103
See, e.g., Horn Abbot, Ltd. v. Sarsaparilla, Ltd., 601 F. Supp. 360, 370 n.12 (1984)
(“[W]here . . . notice has been given and a hearing has been held, the court may in its
discretion impose the order for twenty days initially, pending a prompt hearing on a
preliminary injunction within that time.”).
104
See Miller v. Lehman, 736 F.2d 1268, 1269 (9th Cir. 1984).
105
See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (2000); see also supra note 101 and accompanying text
(indicating that TROs are treated as preliminary injunctions when extended beyond twenty
days).
106
See In re Arthur Treacher’s Franchise Litig., 689 F.2d 1150, 1153-54 (3d Cir. 1982).
It can be said that:
when a temporary restraining order is extended far
beyond its statutory limits, even though it is
authorized by the consent of the party against whom
it is directed, such an order begins to lose its
character as a temporary restraining order and begins
taking on characteristics of a preliminary injunction
order which, under 28 U.S.C. 1292(a)(1), is
appealable.
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effectively decides the merits of the case, it is again treated as a preliminary
injunction and is therefore appealable.107 This argument would likely be
difficult to make in a trademark infringement case unless temporary loss of
use of the mark in question would effectively prevent any further use.
[42] Notwithstanding any issues as to appeal, the restrained party may move
to dissolve or modify the TRO even before the preliminary injunction
hearing.108 If the parties are adequately prepared, such a hearing may be
treated as an application for a preliminary injunction.109 In such a hearing,
the burden is on the party seeking the injunction to establish the need for
such relief.110
B. Preliminary Injunction
1. Generally
[43] A preliminary injunction is generally sought when a plaintiff seeks to
halt a defendant’s use of an infringing trademark while awaiting a trial on the
merits, but has either elected not to seek a TRO or was denied a TRO,
usually because the threat of irreparable harm could not be shown to be
sufficiently immediate. Additionally, when a TRO has been issued, courts
often issue an OSC.111 Like a TRO, a preliminary injunction is essentially an

Id.

107

See Romer v. Green Point Sav. Bank, 27 F.3d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1994) (discussing the
serious ramifications of a TRO preventing a planned stock conversion within the time
allotted by law).
108
See FED. R. CIV. P. 65(b), which states:
[o]n [two] days notice to the party who obtained the
temporary restraining order without notice or on such
shorter notice to that party as the court may prescribe,
the adverse party may appear and move its
dissolution or modification and in that event the court
shall proceed to hear and determine such motion as
expeditiously as the ends of justice require.
109

See Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Bhd. of Teamsters Local 70, 415 U.S. 423, 441

(1974).
110

See id. (“[T]he party seeking the injunction would bear the burden of demonstrating
the various factors justifying preliminary injunctive relief, such as the likelihood of
irreparable injury to it if an injunction is denied and its likelihood of success on the merits.”).
111
See supra Part II.A.5.
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order from a court to a defendant to immediately cease any further use of an
infringing mark for the purpose of preserving the status quo.112
[44] When an OSC113 has been issued, the moving papers supporting the
TRO application, along with any additional declarations or memoranda
responding to points raised in the defendant’s papers, are generally used as
the moving papers supporting the application for a preliminary injunction.114
If no TRO was applied for, then the moving papers generally should include
“[a] Notice of Application and Application for Preliminary Injunction; [a]
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of [the] Motion; [any]
Affidavits and/or Declarations in Support of [the] Motion; [and a] Proposed
Order Granting [the] Motion.”115 Local rules may require additional moving
papers.
[45] The plaintiff must couch its request for a preliminary injunction as one
based upon a strong showing that: (1) it is likely to prevail on the merits at
trial; and (2) it will continue to suffer irreparable injury if the preliminary
injunction is not granted.116 For instance, in Ty, Inc. v. Jones Group, Inc., a
112

See Sierra On-Line, Inc. v. Phoenix Software, Inc., 739 F.2d 1415, 1422 (9th Cir.

1984).

113

See supra Part II.A.5.
See SCHWARZER ET AL., supra note 11, § 13:153.
115
See id., § 13.154; see also Welker v. Cicerone, 174 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1059 (C.D.
Cal. 2001) (stating that “declarations and evidence supporting [a preliminary injunction
motion] need not conform to the standards for a summary judgment motion or to the Federal
Rules of Evidence,” due to “the urgency involved and the limited time that a preliminary
injunction remain [sic] in effect”).
116
Each circuit has its own formulation of this standard. See, e.g., I.P. Lund Trading
ApS v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 33 (1st Cir. 1998) (holding that a preliminary injunction
will issue if there is a likelihood of success on merits, irreparable harm will occur if the
injunction does not issue, the threat of injury to the movant outweighs any harm the
injunction may inflict on the non-movant, and granting the preliminary injunction will not
violate public interest); see also A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1013
(9th Cir. 2001) (holding that an injunction will issue if there exists either a likelihood of
success on merits and the threat of irreparable injury or if serious questions are raised and the
balance of hardships tips in favor of the movant); Fed. Express Corp. v. Fed. Espresso, Inc.,
201 F.3d 168, 173 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that an injunction will issue if there exists
irreparable injury and either likelihood of success on the merits or sufficiently serious
questions going to the merits to make them fair grounds for litigation). The Federal Circuit
reviews procedural matters under the law of the regional circuit in which the district court
sits. See Payless Shoesource, Inc. v. Reebok Int’l, Ltd., 998 F.2d 985, 987-88 (Fed. Cir.
1993) (holding that the Federal Circuit defers to the law of the circuit in which the district
court sits in reviewing a lower court’s decision to grant or deny a request for injunctive
relief).
114
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manufacturer of small, plush animals filled with plastic pellets sold under the
BEANIE BABIES mark brought suit against a competitor.117 The
competitor, a licensee of NASCAR, began manufacturing and selling
BEANIE RACERS, which are bean-filled replicas of NASCAR racing
cars.118 The plaintiff moved for a preliminary injunction.119 In affirming the
grant of preliminary injunctive relief, the circuit court employed a sliding
scale analysis which found that “the more likely the plaintiff will succeed on
the merits, the less the balance of irreparable harms need favor the plaintiff’s
position.”120
[46] In order to employ this sliding scale analysis, the court first must
determine whether the plaintiff has some likelihood of success on the merits
of the underlying action.121 In order to demonstrate a likelihood of success
on the merits, the plaintiff must establish: “‘(1) that it has a protectible
trademark, and (2) a likelihood of confusion as to the origin of the
defendant’s product.’”122 The burden of proof, however, does not rise to a
full trial on the merits; rather, at the preliminary injunction stage, the plaintiff
need only demonstrate “that it has a ‘better than negligible’ chance of
succeeding on the merits so that injunctive relief would be justified.”123
The remaining circuits articulate a standard based upon likelihood of success on the
merits and irreparable injury. See Pappan Enters., Inc. v. Hardee’s Food Sys., Inc., 143 F.3d
800, 803 (3d Cir. 1998); In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust Litig., 333 F.3d 517, 526 (4th Cir.
2003); Sugar Busters, LLC v. Brennan, 177 F.3d 258, 265 (5th Cir. 1999); Taubman Co. v.
Webfeats, 319 F.3d 770, 774 (6th Cir. 2003); AM Gen. Corp. v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 311
F.3d 796, 803 (7th Cir. 2002); Hubbard Feeds, Inc. v. Animal Feed Supplement, Inc., 182
F.3d 598, 601 (8th Cir. 1999); SCFC ILC, Inc. v. Visa USA, Inc., 936 F.2d 1096, 1098 (10th
Cir. 1991); Int’l Cosmetics Exch., Inc. v. Gapardis Health & Beauty, Inc., 303 F.3d 1242,
1246 (11th Cir. 2002).
117
Ty, Inc. v. Jones Group, Inc., 237 F.3d 891 (7th Cir. 2001).
118
Id. at 895.
119
Id.
120
Id. “A party seeking to obtain a preliminary injunction must demonstrate: (1) its case
has some likelihood of success on the merits; (2) that no adequate remedy at law exists; and
(3) it will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is not granted.” Id. (citing Abbott Labs. v.
Mead Johnson & Co., 971 F.2d 6, 11 (7th Cir. 1992)). If these first three conditions are met,
then the court must: (4) “consider the irreparable harm that the nonmoving party will suffer
if preliminary relief is granted;” and (5) “consider the public interest.” Id. (citing Storck
USA, L.P. v. Farley Candy Co., 14 F.3d 311, 314 (7th Cir. 1994)).
121
Id. at 896.
122
Id. at 897 (citing Int’l Kennel Club, Inc. v. Mighty Star, Inc., 846 F.2d 1079, 1084
(7th Cir. 1988)). To demonstrate that it has a protectible trademark, the movant must show
that “it has a better than negligible chance of proving that the mark has acquired secondary
meaning.” Id.
123
Id. Likelihood of confusion is determined through consideration of the following
factors:
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[47] In Ty, Inc., the district court previously determined that four of the
confusion factors were in favor of the defendant: (1) the degree of care; (2)
the strength of the marks; (3) actual confusion; and (4) lack of intent to palm
off the goods of the plaintiff.124 The district court determined, and the
appellate court affirmed, however, that the manner of the BEANIE mark and
Jones’ BEANIE RACERS mark created a better than negligible chance of a
likelihood of confusion.125 The court also determined that the harm to the
movant would be more significant if a preliminary injunction did not issue.126
Thus, the appellate court affirmed the granting of the preliminary
injunction.127
[48] Once the plaintiff demonstrates a colorable claim, it must then
demonstrate that the hardship to the plaintiff in denying the injunction
outweighs the defendant’s burden should the injunction be granted.128 In

(1) the similarity of the marks; (2) the similarity of
the goods; (3) the relationship between the parties’
channels of trade; (4) the relationship between the
parties’ advertising; (5) the classes of prospective
purchasers; (6) evidence of actual confusion; (7) the
defendants’ intent in its adopting mark; and (8) the
strength of the plaintiff’s mark.
I.P. Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 43 (1st Cir. 1998). In considering
whether products are closely related for the purposes of likelihood of confusion, “[a] ‘closely
related’ product is one ‘which would reasonably be thought by the buying public to come
from the same source, or thought to be affiliated with, connected with, or sponsored by, the
trademark owner.’” Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 978 F.2d 947, 958 (7th
Cir. 1992).
Each circuit has its own formulation of the above mentioned factors for determining
likelihood of confusion. See Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d
Cir. 1961); Interpace Corp. v. Lapp, Inc., 721 F.2d 460, 463 (3d Cir. 1983); Resorts of
Pinehurst v. Pinehurst Nat’l Corp., 148 F.3d 417, 422-23 (4th Cir. 1998); Sunbeam Prods.,
Inc. v. West Bend Co., 123 F.3d 246, 257 (5th Cir. 1997); Frisch’s Rests., Inc. v. Elby’s Big
Boy, Inc., 670 F.2d 642, 648 (6th Cir. 1982); Smith Fiberglass Prods., Inc. v. Ameron, Inc.,
7 F.3d 1327, 1329 (7th Cir. 1993); Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Rauh Rubber, Inc., 130 F.3d
1305, 1308 (8th Cir. 1997); AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th Cir.
1979); King of the Mountain Sports, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 185 F.3d 1084, 1089-90 (10th
Cir. 1999); John H. Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d 966, 972 (11th Cir. 1983);
In re E. I. DuPont De Nemours & Co, 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
124
Ty, Inc., 237 F.3d at 898.
125
Id. at 901.
126
Id. at 901-02.
127
Id. at 904.
128
See infra notes 116-23 and accompanying text.
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other words, the plaintiff must show that the hardships it would endure if
such relief is not granted are greater than the hardships the defendant would
endure if such relief is granted.
[49] In the context of a trademark infringement case, the plaintiff will
naturally point out the hardships of sacrificing the marketing of its mark and
the loss of sales due to consumer confusion as to the plaintiff’s affiliation
with the defendant’s goods or services. On the other hand, the defendant will
argue the hardship of losing its right to do business under its chosen mark,
which may represent its very business identity and existence. The balance of
hardships, then, may depend upon a comparison of the length of time the
plaintiff and the defendant have been using the mark and the amount of
resources each has invested in the mark. Any delay by the plaintiff in
bringing the infringement action may be used against it, as the defendant will
argue that its hardship increases with the passage of time.129
[50] Once the court determines the benefits and burdens of deciding to grant
or deny a request for injunctive relief, it must then look to the public’s best
interests.130 In the context of trademark infringement cases, the relevant
public entity is the consumer.131 In other words, courts seek to protect the
public interest in trademark infringement cases by protecting the buying
public in regards to whatever goods or services are the subject of the mark in
dispute.132
[51] Generally, the plaintiff will argue that protection of consumers includes
protection from the deception of a confusingly similar mark.133 If the ever
129

See, e.g., Stokely-Van Camp, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., No. 86-C-6159, 1987 WL 6300,
at *3 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 29, 1987) (holding that the plaintiff’s three month delay in bringing suit
increased the balance of hardships in the defendant’s favor and contributed to the court’s
decision to deny preliminary injunction).
130
See PACCAR, Inc. v. TeleScan Techs., L.L.C., 115 F. Supp. 2d 772, 780 (E.D. Mich.
2000).
131
See Standard & Poor’s Corp. v. Commodity Exch., Inc., 683 F.2d 704, 712 (2d Cir.
1982) (upholding an injunction against the defendant enjoining any further trading of futures
contracts based upon the plaintiff’s stock index which made use of the plaintiff’s name,
marks, and reputation).
132
See Dentsply Int’l, Inc. v. Great White, Inc. 132 F. Supp. 2d 310, 324 (M.D. Pa.
2000) (“Where a likelihood of confusion arises out of the concurrent use of an infringing
mark, the infringer’s use damages the public interest by spawning confusion in the market.”).
133
See United States v. Washington Mint, L.L.C., 115 F. Supp. 2d 1089, 1105 (D. Minn.
2000) (“The public interest favors injunctive relief in the trademark infringement context
when confusion in the marketplace as to the origin of the defendant’s products has
occurred.”).
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important likelihood of confusion can be established, then the plaintiff can
argue that it naturally follows that preliminary injunctive relief is necessary
to protect consumers from such confusion.134 This argument is particularly
important when the balance of hardships is relatively even, possibly tipping
the scales in favor of preliminary injunctive relief.135
[52] On the other hand, the defendant may argue that protecting the public
interest includes giving consumers a competitive free market, which would
be adversely affected by imposition of preliminary injunctive relief on the
defendant’s use of the disputed mark.136 Because the consumer protection
arguments of both the plaintiff and the defendant are valid, satisfying this
requirement may well come down to a balancing of these two
considerations,137 and the court’s determination will likely turn on the
strength of the plaintiff’s case.138
2. Supporting Evidence
[53] The remedy of a preliminary injunction does not involve as great a
degree of exigency as does a TRO. Therefore, because the time constraints
134

See, for example, Opticians Ass’n of America v. Lenox Laboratories., Inc., 920 F.2d
187 (3d Cir. 1990), which states that:
[p]ublic interest can be defined a number of ways,
but in a trademark case, it is most often a synonym
for the right of the public not to be deceived or
confused. Having already established that there is a
likelihood of consumer confusion created by the
concurrent use of the [marks at issue], it follows that
if such use continues, the public interest would be
damaged. Conversely, a prohibition upon [further]
use of the marks would eliminate that confusion.
Id. at 197-98 (citations omitted).
135
See MCCARTHY, supra note 11, § 30:51-52.
136
See, e.g., Calvin Klein Cosmetics Corp. v. Lenox Labs., Inc., 815 F.2d 500, 505 (8th
Cir. 1987) (“By the very nature of a trademark action, the value placed on free competition
must be weighed against any individual’s property interest in that trademark, so that the
analytic focus should also be on the consumer’s ability to obtain the lowest priced goods.”).
137
See, e.g., Aveda Corp. v. Evita Mktg., 706 F. Supp. 1419, 1431-32 (D. Minn. 1989)
(“[The public interest factor] involves balancing of the interest in protecting the public from
confusion or deception with the interest in a competitive market.”).
138
See, e.g., Waldmann Lighting Co. v. Halogen Lighting Sys., Inc., No. 91-C-3491,
1993 WL 243388, at *5 (N.D. Ill. June 30, 1993) (“[T]he question of whether the ‘public
interest’ will be served by one result or the other hinges on the merits of the case.”).
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are not as strict, a detailed evidentiary showing should be provided to the
court, including detailed factual and expert declarations. The factual
declarations can be from consumers that were confused between the marks of
the movant and the non-movant, as well as declarations from company
executives concerning expansion of product lines, other instances of actual
confusion, and the monetary and non-monetary damage to the mark.139
[54] Depending upon the size of the litigation and the potential for damage, a
movant may desire to designate several consultants upon the filing of the
action, including consultants with specialties in corrective advertising,
damages, licensing, linguistics, the expansion of the products, trademark law,
and surveys.140 Experts can be retained based upon the findings within each
consultant report.141 These experts can then generate reports that would be
139

Two unreported cases in which Mr. Spiess, co-author, participated as counsel address
the form that factual declarations may take. See LTT Int’l Dev. & Trading Corp. v. ABC
Distrib., Inc., No. CV 00-00776 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2000); City Fin. v. Citigroup, Inc., No.
99-CV-1323 (C.D. Cal., Oct. 26, 1999).
140
For instance, in Trovan, Ltd. v. Pfizer, Inc., No. CV 98-00094 LGB (C.D. Cal., Jan.
7, 1998), the plaintiffs filed suit over Pfizer’s use of the identical TROVAN mark. The
plaintiffs retained several consultants, six of whom were later designated as experts: Weston
Anson, Nancy J. Budd, Dr. Jacob Jacoby, Neil A. Smith, Michael J. Wagner, and David
Yerkes. The offices of Mr. Anson prepared a report regarding the potential for the licensing
of the TROVAN mark. Nancy Budd prepared a report regarding corrective advertising.
Jacob Jacoby commissioned a consumer survey, sampling physicians. Neil Smith prepared a
declaration regarding trademark law. Michael Wagner prepared a report regarding damages.
David Yerkes prepared a report regarding the origin of the word “Trovan.”
At about this same time, Pfizer filed a motion for summary judgment. See Trovan, Ltd.
v. Pfizer, Inc., Case No. CV 98-00094 LGB (C.D. Cal., Sept. 22, 1998). With the assistance
of these experts, at least one of whom filed a declaration in support of the opposition to
summary judgment, Trovan was able to defeat the motion. See Trovan, Ltd. v. Pfizer, Inc.,
Case No. CV 98-00094 LGB (C.D. Cal., Feb. 24, 1999) (under seal). A trial was then held
on the merits. The majority of these experts testified at trial. See generally Trovan, Ltd. v.
Pfizer, Inc., 2000 WL 709149 (C.D. Cal. 2000). The plaintiffs subsequently moved for a
new trial and appealed the denial of the granting of a permanent injunction. See Trovan, Ltd.
v. Pfizer, Inc., 2001 WL 1346020 (9th Cir. 2001).
After appellate procedure, the Lanham Act claim  the only claim remaining  was
dismissed by the district court. See Trovan, Ltd. v. Pfizer, Inc., Case No. CV 98-00094 LGB
(C.D. Cal., July 28, 2003). The case is currently pending on appeal.
141
See supra notes 67, 140 and accompanying text. A variety of experts can be retained.
For instance, in Seven Lives, Inc. v. Montoya, Case No. 00-CV-8851 CBM (C.D. Cal. Aug.
21, 2000) (unreported case in which Mr. Speiss, co-author, participated as counsel), the
plaintiff moved for, and received, a TRO, though the TRO did not go into effect until
December 7, 2000, because plaintiffs did not post required bond until that date. The
defendants then retained an expert in the gourmet cookie industry. Through her declaration,
the defendants were able to show that the cookie designs the defendants were enjoined from
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provided to the non-movant, who may then seek to depose the experts or
designate both rebuttal experts and their own experts.142
3. Notice
[55] In contrast to TROs, preliminary injunctions must be issued with
notice.143 Such notice must be given to the “adverse party,” including
opposing parties and any nonparties who will be directly affected by the
preliminary injunction.144 The amount of notice required varies from court to
court. Some courts require a five-day notice, while other courts require
notice adequate under the totality of circumstances.145

making were not the original creations of the plaintiffs, but rather were in the public domain.
The motion for preliminary injunction was denied.
According to at least one expert, however, “an adverse inference for failure to present
survey evidence of confusion is never appropriate on an application for a temporary
restraining order or preliminary injunction motion.” Sandra Edelman, Failure to Conduct a
Survey in Trademark Infringement Cases: A Critique of the Adverse Inference, 90
TRADEMARK REP. 746, 766 (2000). Edelman goes on to say that:
The burden of amassing the necessary evidentiary
showing in a compressed period of time is onerous
enough without expecting the movant to have
conducted a survey. In many instances, if a plaintiff
acts promptly, the defendant's products or sales
material may not yet be publicly available, making it
quite difficult to use the product or material in a
survey. In any event, the movant for preliminary
injunctive relief need only show a probability of
success at trial; it should not, therefore, be necessary
for the movant to put forward its entire case at such
an early stage of the proceedings.
Id.

142

See, e.g., Anthony L. Fletcher & David J. Kera, The Fiftieth Year of Administration
of the Lanham Trademark Act of 1946, 87 TRADEMARK REP. 741, 789 (1997). If the nonmoving party designates its own experts, the moving party may desire to designate its own
rebuttal experts. If an expert report is not rebutted, the court may infer that it was due to the
strength of the report, and not the cost of retaining a rebuttal expert.
143
FED. R. CIV. P. 65(a)(1).
144
See Parker v. Ryan, 960 F.2d 543, 545 (5th Cir. 1992).
145
Compare id. (listing only “two exceptional circumstances under which compliance
with [the five-day requirement] is not required), with Rosen v. Siegel, 106 F.3d 28, 32 (2d
Cir. 1997) (requiring such notice as to give the adverse party “fair opportunity” to prepare
for and respond to a request for preliminary injunction).
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[56] If a TRO has been sought, notice of the preliminary injunction is
effected by service of the TRO (if issued), the OSC, the summons, and the
complaint (if not already served).146 The OSC will set forth the requirements
for notice.147 Otherwise, notice is generally effected by service of a notice of
motion.148 Again, local rules may apply.
4. Procedure and Bond
[57] As with TROs, applications for preliminary injunctions should be filed
as soon as is practical under the circumstances.149 Any delay may result in
some question as to the urgency or irreparable nature of the injury, and may
result in prejudicial reliance on the part of the defendant.150 Some local rules
require a conference before filing a motion for a preliminary injunction in
order to allow opposing counsel the opportunity to discuss the substance of
the motion and a possible resolution.151 If a TRO has been sought, the time
146

SCHWARZER ET AL., supra note 11, § 13:152.10.
See id.
148
Id. § 13:152.11.
149
See Edelman, supra note 35, at 649-50. For example, the following generalizations
apply to cases within the Second Circuit Court of Appeals:
147

(1) [a] delay of less than three months is usually
acceptable; (2) [b]etween three and six months, the
decisions vary; (3) [f]or cases in which the delay is
between six and twelve months, there is a significant
risk that the motion will be denied; and (4) [i]n light
of the above, any plaintiff should carefully consider
the high risks and attendant extra fees and costs of
seeking preliminary injunctive relief from a New
York federal court when the delay is greater than one
year.
Id. at 650-51 (citations omitted).
150
See, e.g., Ideal Indus., Inc. v. Gardner Bender, Inc., 612 F.2d 1018, 1025 (7th Cir.
1979) (discussing “whether the [fact that the] defendant had been lulled into a false sense of
security or had acted in reliance on the plaintiff’s delay” influences whether the court will
find that the plaintiff’s decision to delay in moving for a preliminary injunction is
acceptable); c.f. Edelman supra note 35, at 654-55 (“The lack of uniformity among the
various circuit courts as to the relevance of the defendant’s prejudicial reliance continues to
be shown in cases [recently] reported . . . .”).
151
See e.g., C.D. CAL. L.R. 7-3 (requiring such conference at least twenty days before
filing of the motion). Such a requirement effectively postpones any hearing on the motion
for a significant amount of time. Under C.D. CAL. L.R. 7-3, for example, a hearing on the
motion is postponed for at least forty-one days—the twenty-day waiting period is added to
the twenty-one-day notice of motion period. SCHWARZER ET AL., supra note 11, § 13:145.6.
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for filing opposing papers will generally be set by the OSC; otherwise, the
time requirements for such papers are the same as for motions generally.152
[58] Discovery may be necessary to prepare for the preliminary injunction
hearing. Generally, discovery may not be conducted until the parties meet to
confer about the case.153 However, either party may seek an order permitting
immediate discovery by showing an urgent need for information.154 In
addition, the party seeking injunctive relief must be prepared to post a bond
of the injunctive relief if granted. As with granting a TRO, the court must
expressly consider the posting of a bond prior to the issuance of a
preliminary injunction.155
5. Hearing
[59] When a TRO has been issued, the OSC generally sets the date for the
hearing of the preliminary injunction.156 If the TRO was issued without
notice, the hearing date must be set for the “earliest possible time.”157 Local
rules may further specify time limits, regardless of notice.158 If no TRO has
issued, an application for a preliminary injunction is generally treated like
other motions regarding procedure.159 However, local rules may again
specify time limits based on various circumstances.160
[60] The nature of the hearing on the motion for preliminary injunction is
entirely up to the court’s discretion.161 In fact, the court has discretion to
152

SCHWARZER ET AL., supra note 11, § 13:156.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(d).
154
See Stanley v. Univ. of S. Cal., 13 F.3d 1313, 1326 (9th Cir. 1994).
155
See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 39, § 2954 (citing Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc. v.
Allied Old English, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 123 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) ($100,000 bond posted); Storck
USA, L.P. v. Farley Candy Co., 797 F. Supp. 1399 (N.D. Ill. 1992) ($1.5 million bond
posted)); see also supra notes 68-75 and accompanying text. In Ty, Inc. v. Jones Group,
Inc., 237 F.3d 891, 903-04 (7th Cir. 2001), the appellate court found that the magistrate
judge did not leave the defendant in a vulnerable position prior to a hearing on the merits.
The judge “provided for a bond of $50,000, which he believed would adequately compensate
[the defendant] for any harm that may result from the preliminary injunction.” Id. at 903.
156
SCHWARZER ET AL., supra note 11, § 13:146.
157
FED. R. CIV. P. 65(b).
158
See SCHWARZER ET AL., supra note 11, § 13:148.
159
See SCHWARZER ET AL., supra note 11, § 13:149.
160
See, e.g., C.D. CAL. L.R. 65-1 (stating that where a TRO is sought but denied, a
hearing may be set without regard to the twenty-one-day notice of motion normally
required).
161
See MCCARTHY, supra note 11, § 30:54.
153
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decide the matter relying entirely on affidavits. Most courts, however,
permit hearings, at least when material facts are in dispute.163 Of course, the
burden of persuasion remains with the party seeking injunctive relief.164
[61] Generally, evidence is presented to the court in the form of declarations
or affidavits.165 Although the court has discretion to allow live testimony,166
such testimony is rarely allowed.167 As with TROs, the court has discretion
to allow even inadmissible evidence when hearing a preliminary
injunction.168
[62] Courts also have the discretion to order an advancement of the trial on
the merits and consolidate the trial with the hearing on the application for the
preliminary injunction.169 This is particularly likely when live testimony is
being allowed.170
6. Order and Duration
[63] If the preliminary injunction is granted, the court will generally base its
order on the moving party’s Proposed Order Granting the Motion, or at least
adopt those sections that it finds adequate.171 As with a TRO, the proposed
order should specifically describe the reasons for its issuance and the acts to
be enjoined, or items to be seized.172 Furthermore, the proposed order should
direct the injunction to all persons sought to be enjoined.173 Whether or not
162

FED. R. CIV. P. 43(e).
See, e.g., Landmark Land Co., Inc. v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 990 F.2d 807, 812
(5th Cir. 1993) (finding that an evidentiary hearing is only necessary when the parties
dispute material facts and that otherwise a hearing on the basis of briefs and affidavits is
sufficient).
164
See W. Point-Pepperell, Inc. v. Donovan, 689 F.2d 950, 956 (11th Cir. 1982).
165
See SCHWARZER ET AL., supra note 11, § 13:165.
166
See FED. R. CIV. P. 43(e).
167
See, e.g., Stanley v. Univ. of S. Cal., 13 F.3d 1313, 1326 (9th Cir. 1994) (refusing to
allow oral testimony when the parties had been given a full opportunity to submit written
testimony and argue the matter). But see McDonald’s Corp. v. Robertson, 147 F.3d 1301,
1311-12 (11th Cir. 1998) (finding that live testimony should be allowed when facts are
bitterly disputed and credibility determinations are necessary).
168
See Flynt Distrib. Co. v. Harvey, 734 F.2d 1389, 1394 (9th Cir. 1984). Note,
however, that courts are likely to give inadmissible evidence its proper weight of authority.
169
FED. R. CIV. P. 65(a)(2).
170
SCHWARZER ET AL., supra note 11, § 13:171.
171
Id. § 13:182.
172
See supra notes 68-75 and accompanying text; see also Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v.
Bhd. of Teamsters Local 70, 415 U.S. 423, 444 (1974).
173
See SCHWARZER ET AL., supra note 11, § 13:187.1.
163
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the preliminary injunction is granted, the court must set forth, either in
writing or orally, the findings of fact and conclusions of law upon which it is
basing its decision.174
[64] The court has discretion to decide when the injunction becomes
effective.175 If the court requires the movant to post a bond, however, the
injunction cannot become effective until the bond is secured.176 If there is
danger of irreparable harm occurring before the appropriate paperwork can
be filed and the bond secured, the court may either orally restrain the parties
to be enjoined or extend a previously issued TRO for a reasonable period.177
[65] Although a preliminary injunction is considered a final order for the
purposes of appeal, “the [issuing] court retains the power to modify or
dissolve the injunction at any time on consideration of new facts,” or when
there has been a final decision on the merits and a permanent injunction
issues.178
7. Appeal
[66] “The opposing party has the right to appeal the granting of a
preliminary injunction.”179 This order can be appealed “only when it is
directed to a party, is enforceable by contempt, and grants (or denies) part or

174

FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a); see Ciena Corp. v. Jarrard, 203 F.3d 312, 321 (4th Cir. 2000);
Bradley v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 910 F.2d 1172, 1178-79 (3d Cir. 1990).
175
SCHWARZER ET AL., supra note 11, § 13:184.
176
See FED. R. CIV. P. 65(c); see also supra notes 68-75 and accompanying text.
SCHWARZER ET AL., supra note 11, § 13:191, states that:
[e]xcept for the United States, no party may be
granted a TRO or preliminary injunction without first
posting security “in such sum as the court deems
proper for the payment of such costs and damages as
may be incurred or suffered by any party who is
found to have been wrongfully enjoined.”
Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 65(c)).
177
SCHWARZER ET AL., supra note 11, § 13:185.
178
Id. § 13:212.
179
Id. § 13:1.1; see 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (2000); SCHWARZER ET AL., supra note 11, §
13:10 (“In recognition of their impact, a right of appeal exists from orders granting, denying,
modifying or dissolving preliminary injunctions.”); see also Dayton Area Visually Impaired
Pers., Inc. v. Fisher, 70 F.3d 1474, 1480 (6th Cir. 1995).
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180
all of the ultimate relief sought in the suit.”
From the entry of a
preliminary injunction a party has thirty days to file a notice of appeal.181 In
addition, the “[f]ailure to appeal the grant or denial of a preliminary
injunction does not preclude appeal of a later grant or denial of a permanent
injunction.”182
III. THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS FOR RESOLVING TRADEMARK DISPUTES
[67] There are many forms of civil dispute negotiations, including
mediation, alternative dispute resolution, and arbitration. These forms of
negotiation can all occur in lieu of the filing of a lawsuit, or at any time
during the pendency of the suit.183 These negotiations differ from
transactional negotiations in that one or more parties believe they have rights
against the other that are legally enforceable.184 These rights may be real or
180

Chronicle Publ’g. Co. v. Hantzis, 902 F.2d 1028, 1030 (1st Cir. 1990). In addition,
“[t]he order need not be labeled as an injunction” in order to be appealed; “[o]rders having
the ‘practical effect’ of an injunction may be appealable under § 1292(a)(1) if they have
potentially irreparable consequences, and can effectively be challenged only by an
immediate appeal.” SCHWARZER ET AL., supra note 11, § 13:215.1 (quoting Carson v. Am.
Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 84 (1981)).
181
SCHWARZER ET AL., supra note 11, § 13:216; see id. (explaining that the period may
be extended upon a showing of good cause or excusable neglect).
182
Id. § 13:215.10.
183
Upon the filing of an action, most district courts require that the parties conduct an
early meeting of counsel. During this early meeting of counsel, the parties are more often
than not required to select a forum in which to participate in settlement discussions. See
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f) (“[T]he parties must, as soon as practicable . . . confer to consider . . .
the possibilities for a prompt settlement or resolution of the case . . . .”). The local rules of
the district court in which the lawsuit is filed may specify the mediation procedures that can
be used. For example, C.D. CAL. L.R. 16-14, states:
[i]t is the policy of the Court to encourage disposition
of civil litigation by settlement when such is in the
best interest of the parties. The Court favors any
reasonable means to accomplish this goal. . . . The
parties are urged first to discuss and to attempt to
reach settlement among themselves without resort to
these procedures. It is also the policy of the Court
that unless an alternative settlement procedure is
selected by the parties, the judge assigned to preside
over the civil case (the trial judge) may participate in
facilitating settlement.
184

Sankary, supra note 8, at 1. The goals of business negotiation are as follows: (1)
“[t]o achieve business and financial objectives;” (2) “[t]o maintain business relationships;”
(3) “[t]o reduce risks and liability;” (4) “[t]o foresee and avoid problems;” (5) “[t]o provide

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology
Volume XI, Issue 1
perceived. For instance, the grant or denial of a TRO or preliminary
injunction will provide clarity as to whether these rights are in fact real, or
merely fictional. In addition, the defendant may chose to file a Rule 68 offer
of judgment in order to put settlement pressure on the plaintiff.185 Based
upon these rights, the parties will predict the probable trial outcome and
assign a dollar value to the dispute.186
[68] Regardless of how negotiations are to proceed, the parties must
communicate with each other in order to resolve the dispute successfully.187
Each party must listen actively, acknowledge what is being said, speak to be

for consequences arising from obligations set forth in [the] agreement;” and (6) “[t]o provide
an efficient and cost-effective method of resolving disputes.” Id. at 2.
185
A Rule 68 offer of judgment “provides a procedure by which defendants may be able
to put cost pressure on plaintiffs.” See SCHWARZER ET AL., supra note 11, at § 15:150.
[U]p to 10 days before trial, defendant may serve
plaintiff with an offer to allow judgment to be taken
against the defendant for a specified amount of
money or property with costs then accrued; [i]f
plaintiff accepts, and the offer and notice of
acceptance are filed with the court, the clerk must
enter judgment accordingly; [i]f the offer is not
accepted within 10 days after service, it is deemed
withdrawn. Evidence thereof is inadmissible at trial.
But if the judgment recovered by plaintiff at trial is
not “more favorable” than the defendant’s offer,
plaintiff must pay defendant’s costs incurred after the
offer was made.
Id. “Rule 68 applies only to offers made by defendants. No similar procedure is
provided for settlement demands by plaintiff[s].” Id. at § 15:150.1 (citing Delta Air
Lines, Inc. v. August, 450 U.S. 346, 350 (1981)). It is recommended that the defendant
file such an offer prior to entering into settlement negotiations.
186
Sankary, supra note 8, at 1. Based upon perceived leverage, negotiations ensue in
order to settle the dispute. See generally ROY J. LEWICKI ET AL., ESSENTIALS OF
NEGOTIATION 132-61 (2d ed. 2001) (discussing how parties should find and use leverage in
the negotiation process). Seeking leverage in negotiation usually arises from a perceived
inequity of positions. Id. at 132-33. In these instances, a negotiator believes one of two
things: she has less leverage than the opposing party, or she needs more leverage than the
opposing party to increase the probability of securing a desired outcome. Id.
187
See FISHER & URY, supra note 4, at 33. There are three problems in communication:
first, the negotiators may not be talking to each other in a way to be understood, i.e. they
may be talking to impress their clients; second, a negotiating partner may not be paying
attention to what is being said; and third, the parties may misinterpret what is being said. Id.
at 33-34.
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understood, speak about the needs and motivations of its own client, and
speak for a purpose.188
A. Strategy Development
[69] It is helpful to develop a negotiation strategy outline prior to conducting
the negotiation. Negotiators must anticipate what they want to achieve in a
negotiation and prepare for these events in advance.189 A negotiation
strategy should include a prioritization of the client’s goals, contingency
plans, the best alternative to a negotiated agreement (“BATNA”), and
procedural concerns dealing with agendas and bargaining histories.190 It
should also contain a facilitation section, which discusses the client’s
mindset, as well as an anticipatory outline of the opposing party’s mindset.191
[70] Practitioners must then seek to define the issues. This process is called
framing the negotiation.192 There are many different types of frames,
including: (1) substantive, or what the conflict is about; (2) conflict
management process; (3) characterization, or how the parties define
themselves and who their opponent is; and (4) loss-gain, or how the parties
view the risks associated with particular outcomes.193

188

Id. at 35-37.
LEWICKI ET AL., supra note 186, at 32.
190
See Michael W. Coombs, Strategy Outline II: Union-Management Negotiation 1
(2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Richmond Journal of Law & Technology); see
also LEWICKI ET AL., supra note 186, at 32 (defining goals to include tangibles, such as “rate,
price, specific terms, contract language, [and] fixed packages,” as well as intangibles, “such
as maintaining a certain precedent, defending a principle, or getting an agreement regardless
of cost”). According to Robert H. Mnookin, “[t]he BATNA indicates what [the] negotiator
can do away from the table if no deal is reached. The BATNA must be translated into a
reservation value  the amount at which the bargainer is indifferent between reaching a deal
and walking away to his BATNA.” Robert H. Mnookin, Strategic Barriers to Dispute
Resolution: A Comparison of Bilateral and Multilateral Negotiations, 8 HARV. NEGOT. L.
REV. 1, 5 (2003).
191
Coombs, supra note 190, at 1. Professor Coombs also suggests that negotiators
should develop a list of: (1) “talking points” to enhance the credibility of their client; (2)
items they should say in favor of their client; and (3) a series of open-ended questions which
should be used to start and lead the negotiation. Id. at 1-2. In addition, the list should
include strategic options, including how to negotiate. Id. at 1. Some strategies include the
non-engagement strategy, as well as strategies of competition, collaboration and
accommodation. See LEWICKI ET AL., supra note 186, at 36-40.
192
See LEWICKI ET AL., supra note 186, at 22 (“framing is the means by which the
parties in a negotiation . . . define the problem”).
193
Id. at 25-26.
189
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[71] Most importantly, in developing the negotiation strategy and framing it
to their clients and opponents, negotiators should look toward developing
options for mutual gain that can be proposed to all parties present.194 This
will allow them to maintain flexibility in the negotiation, and simultaneously
convey a clear theme of what outcome the client desires. If this theme is
properly developed, the parties will be able to focus on interests, rather than
on positions.195
B. The Negotiation Process
[72] The client or person with full settlement authority should be physically
present at the negotiation.196 Presence conveys symbolic importance. It
allows all parties to reason with, persuade, and guide one another towards
resolution of the matter.197
[73] During the negotiation, in order to focus on interests rather than on
positions, the parties must use objective criteria, meaning criteria that are
practical and based on fact.198 In order to negotiate with objective criteria,
the negotiators must: (1) continue to employ a framing technique,
characterizing “each issue as a joint search for objective criteria;” (2)
“[r]eason and be open to reason;” and (3) “[n]ever yield to pressure, only to
principle.”199
[74] In practice, the negotiators must create a free flow of information.200
Together with their clients, the negotiators must make a true effort to
understand what the other side desires to achieve.201 Specifically, the
194

See id. at 31.
See FISHER & URY, supra note 4, at 41-57.
196
Arthur Nakazato, Tips from the Bench on Handling Intellectual Property Cases (Aug.
27, 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Richmond Journal of Law & Technology).
If physical presence is not possible, however, the parties should take steps to create a face-toface relationship prior to the negotiation.
197
See KATHLEEN KELLEY REARDON, PERSUASION IN PRACTICE 2-3 (1991).
198
FISHER & URY, supra note 4, at 81-94.
199
Id. at 88; see id. at 89 (“Insisting that an agreement be based on objective criteria
does not mean insisting that it be based solely on the criterion you advance. One standard of
legitimacy does not preclude the existence of others.”).
200
See LEWICKI ET AL., supra note 186, at 99. “[E]ffective information exchange
promotes the development of good integrative solutions. For the necessary exchange to
occur, negotiators must be willing to reveal their true objectives and to listen to each other
carefully.” Id. at 96-97.
201
See id. at 97 (suggesting that negotiators must be careful not to form predispositions
about their negotiating partners, and be mindful of the cognitive bias formed by themselves
195
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negotiators must identify and define the problem in a way that is mutually
acceptable to both sides, depersonalize it, and then understand it.202 The
negotiators must be firm about their client’s primary interests and needs, but
flexible about the manner in which these needs are met. 203 They must also
seek to form all communications with regard to content, structure, and
delivery style.204
C. Obstacles to Settlement
[75] There are four major obstacles to achieving a successful settlement.
These barriers are: (1) strategic barriers; (2) principal and agent problems; (3)
cognitive and psychological barriers; and (4) reactive devaluation or
compromises and concessions.205
1. Strategic Barriers
[76] Strategic barriers arise from the “tension between the desire for
distributive gain — getting a bigger slice of the pie — and the opportunity
for joint gains — finding ways to make the pie bigger.”206 The players in this
game are often in an awkward position: “[t]hey want to make the most
favorable agreement that they can, while avoiding the risk of making no
agreement at all; and, to certain extent [sic], these goals are contradictory.”207
and their opponents); see also HERB COHEN, YOU CAN NEGOTIATE ANYTHING: HOW TO GET
WHAT YOU WANT, 150 (1994) (arguing that negotiators must practice a win-win style, and
seek to understand before being understood).
202
See LEWICKI ET AL., supra note 186, at 98-101.
203
See id. at 98.
204
See id. at 159. The content of the message should be focused on: (1) how to make
the offer attractive to the other party; (2) how to frame the messages so the other party will
say yes; (3) how to make messages normative; and (4) how to obtain agreements in
principle. Id. at 159-60.
205
Robert H. Mnookin, Why Negotiations Fail: An Exploration of Barriers to the
Resolution of Conflict, 8 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 235, 239-47 (1993).
206
Mnookin, supra note 190, at 4. Further, “strategic barriers are those that can cause
rational, self-interested disputants to act in a manner that proves to be both individually and
collectively disadvantageous.” Id. at 2; see also LEWICKI ET AL., supra note 186, at 118
(“Those who believe in the mythical fixed pie assume that the possibility for integrative
settlements and mutually beneficial trade-offs doesn’t exist, and they suppress efforts to
search for such settlements or trade-offs.”).
207
Mnookin, supra note 190, at 7. It can also be said that:
[i]f one party indicates a willingness to settle for any
terms, even if the gain is only marginal, he or she will
likely arrive at an agreement, but not a very attractive
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“In sum, hard-bargaining tactics that may be rational for self-interested
parties concerned with maximizing the size of their own slice of the pie can
sometimes lead to inefficient outcomes.”208
[77] It goes without saying that “[t]hose subjected to such tactics often
respond in kind.” At the very best, the result is “additional costs of the
dispute resolution process, and, at worst, failure to consummate a mutually
beneficial agreement.”209 Therefore, “accurate information about each
negotiator’s goals, priorities, preferences, resources, and opportunities is
essential to reach agreements that offer optimal ‘gain from trade.’”210
2. Principal and Agent Problems
[78] A corporate officer or director has a duty of care owed to the
corporation. First, “a director or officer must ‘perform his functions . . . with
the care that an ordinarily prudent person would reasonably be expected to
exercise in a like position and under similar circumstances.’”211 Second is
the “‘business judgment rule,’ which describes the standard by which courts
evaluate whether a director or officer has discharged his obligation.”212

one. On the other hand, if he takes a hard position
and sticks to it, he is likely to reach a favorable
agreement if he reaches any agreement at all--but he
stands a good chance of being left out in the cold.
Id. “Strategic barriers . . . reflect models of human behavior premised on rational, selfinterested parties seeking to maximize their own interests.” Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H.
Mnookin, Business Lawyering and Value Creation for Clients: Symposium on Business
Lawyers and Value Creation for Clients, 74 OR. L. REV. 1, 12 (1995).
208
Mnookin, supra note 190, at 7.
209
Id.
210
Id. at 14. Keep in mind, however, that “total frankness and ‘full disclosure’  or
simply greater frankness and fuller disclosure than practiced by the other side of the
negotiation  leave one side vulnerable in the distributive aspect of bargaining.” Id.
211
Robert H. Mnookin & Robert B. Wilson, Rational Bargaining and Market
Efficiency: Understanding Pennzoil v. Texaco, 75 VA. L. REV. 295, 317 (1989) (quoting
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.01(a)
(Tentative Draft No. 4, 1985)).
212
Id. “The purpose of the business judgment rule is to protect officers and directors
‘from risks inherent in hindsight reviews of their unsuccessful decisions, and to avoid the
risk of stifling innovation and venturesome business activity.’” Id. (quoting PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.01(a) cmt. d (Tentative
Draft No. 4, 1985)).
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[79] However, a corporate officer may be held personally liable despite the
business judgment rule if they “fail[] to inform themselves of ‘all information
reasonably available to them and relevant to their decision.’”213 Therefore,
“[b]ecause it is impossible to ascertain exactly how much information a court
may require a director to have obtained in order” to become informed,
corporate executives may be discouraged from settling a matter before they
have exhausted all litigation remedies so as to avoid personal liability.214
Faced with settling a matter prior to litigation and possibly incurring the
wrath of a shareholder action, or litigating a matter that should have been
settled, a corporate officer may choose the latter.215
[80] In addition, practitioners may be “a barrier to the efficient resolution of
business disputes through early settlement.”216 For instance, defense lawyers
may prolong an action that could be settled in their clients’ favor in order to
continue to collect fees.217 Likewise, because plaintiffs’ lawyers are
sometimes paid on a contingency basis, settlement might result despite the
fact that it is not in their clients’ best interests, since the plaintiff’s counsel
himself, due to the contingency fee agreement, may bear the costs of
investigators, expert witnesses and trial.218
3. Psychological Barriers
[81] Practitioners “tend to share and apply a rational, economicallygrounded analysis to determine whether to settle and upon what terms” in
order to “facilitate[] distributive negotiation, rational decision making, and a
higher rate of settlement.”219 Disputants, on the other hand, are influenced
more by cognitive and social-psychological occurrences that may hinder their
ability to rationally analyze expected financial values.220 “Psychological
barriers, which are cognitive and perceptual in nature, prevent disputants

213

Id. at 319 (quoting Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985)).
Id. at 320-22.
215
See id. at 317-22.
216
Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 207, at 11.
217
See id. at 12.
218
See id.
219
Nancy A. Welsh, Making Deals In Court  Connected Mediation: What’s Justice
Got to Do with It?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 787, 804 (2001) (citing Russell Korobkin & Chris
Guthrie, Psychology, Economics and Settlement: A New Look at the Role of the Lawyer, 76
TEX. L. REV. 77, 82-83, 95-112, 122 (1997)).
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from acting in a value-maximizing, utilitarian manner.”221 These barriers
include, but are not limited to, “the framing of settlement offers, personal
animus and equity seeking, and the reactive devaluation of offers proposed
by the adversary.”222 Because of these psychological barriers, a party may
begin to incorrectly and unjustifiably assume the motives and intentions of
the other party.223
4. Reactive Devaluation or Compromises and Concessions
[82] Reactive devaluation is the “tendency to evaluate proposals less
favorably after they have been offered by one’s adversary.”224 It stems from
the belief that what is good for one side must be bad for the other side.225
However, negotiations are rarely fixed-sum.226 In order to overcome reactive
devaluation, it may be helpful to either: (1) have the client determine in
advance what outcomes are acceptable to them; or (2) have the parties work
together so that the solution is jointly initiated, or even appears as if it was
the opposing party’s idea.227
IV. CONCLUSION
[83] Most clients seek the advice of counsel when they have only a general
knowledge of a few of the items that are available on the legal buffet table,
and they are often operating under prices that are several years old. As
trademark practitioners, we must deploy the following five-step approach
when presented with a conflict.
[84] First, we must gather and analyze all evidence immediately available to
our clients, and at our own disposal. Second, we must then fully examine the
immediacy of the injury to our clients. Third, we must survey the buffet
table, and provide our clients with detailed information regarding those items
221
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that we believe may fulfill their needs. Simultaneous with this selection
process, we must provide a budget analysis of the fees and costs associated
with each item. Fourth, after fully appraising our clients of all of the options
available to them, we must counsel them to select an appropriate option.
Fifth, we must be fully prepared for battle  to gather, analyze, stake
appropriate claims, and then skillfully resolve the matter.

